diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme')
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go | 317 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go | 306 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go | 77 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go | 392 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go | 307 |
7 files changed, 1168 insertions, 267 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go index fa365b7b..02fde12d 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go @@ -4,7 +4,10 @@ // Package acme provides an implementation of the // Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec. -// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02 for details. +// The intial implementation was based on ACME draft-02 and +// is now being extended to comply with RFC 8555. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02 +// and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for details. // // Most common scenarios will want to use autocert subdirectory instead, // which provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt @@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ import ( const ( // LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA. - LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" // ALPNProto is the ALPN protocol name used by a CA server when validating // tls-alpn-01 challenges. @@ -57,7 +60,10 @@ var idPeACMEIdentifierV1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1} const ( maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain - maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in bytes + maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in DER bytes + // Used for decoding certs from application/pem-certificate-chain response, + // the default when in RFC mode. + maxCertChainSize = maxCertSize * maxChainLen // Max number of collected nonces kept in memory. // Expect usual peak of 1 or 2. @@ -116,21 +122,48 @@ type Client struct { // identifiable by the server, in case they are causing issues. UserAgent string - dirMu sync.Mutex // guards writes to dir - dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method + cacheMu sync.Mutex + dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method + kid keyID // cached Account.URI obtained from registerRFC or getAccountRFC noncesMu sync.Mutex nonces map[string]struct{} // nonces collected from previous responses } +// accountKID returns a key ID associated with c.Key, the account identity +// provided by the CA during RFC based registration. +// It assumes c.Discover has already been called. +// +// accountKID requires at most one network roundtrip. +// It caches only successful result. +// +// When in pre-RFC mode or when c.getRegRFC responds with an error, accountKID +// returns noKeyID. +func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) keyID { + c.cacheMu.Lock() + defer c.cacheMu.Unlock() + if !c.dir.rfcCompliant() { + return noKeyID + } + if c.kid != noKeyID { + return c.kid + } + a, err := c.getRegRFC(ctx) + if err != nil { + return noKeyID + } + c.kid = keyID(a.URI) + return c.kid +} + // Discover performs ACME server discovery using c.DirectoryURL. // // It caches successful result. So, subsequent calls will not result in // a network round-trip. This also means mutating c.DirectoryURL after successful call // of this method will have no effect. func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) { - c.dirMu.Lock() - defer c.dirMu.Unlock() + c.cacheMu.Lock() + defer c.cacheMu.Unlock() if c.dir != nil { return *c.dir, nil } @@ -143,27 +176,53 @@ func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) { c.addNonce(res.Header) var v struct { - Reg string `json:"new-reg"` - Authz string `json:"new-authz"` - Cert string `json:"new-cert"` - Revoke string `json:"revoke-cert"` - Meta struct { - Terms string `json:"terms-of-service"` - Website string `json:"website"` - CAA []string `json:"caa-identities"` + Reg string `json:"new-reg"` + RegRFC string `json:"newAccount"` + Authz string `json:"new-authz"` + AuthzRFC string `json:"newAuthz"` + OrderRFC string `json:"newOrder"` + Cert string `json:"new-cert"` + Revoke string `json:"revoke-cert"` + RevokeRFC string `json:"revokeCert"` + NonceRFC string `json:"newNonce"` + KeyChangeRFC string `json:"keyChange"` + Meta struct { + Terms string `json:"terms-of-service"` + TermsRFC string `json:"termsOfService"` + WebsiteRFC string `json:"website"` + CAA []string `json:"caa-identities"` + CAARFC []string `json:"caaIdentities"` + ExternalAcctRFC bool `json:"externalAccountRequired"` } } if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { return Directory{}, err } + if v.OrderRFC == "" { + // Non-RFC compliant ACME CA. + c.dir = &Directory{ + RegURL: v.Reg, + AuthzURL: v.Authz, + CertURL: v.Cert, + RevokeURL: v.Revoke, + Terms: v.Meta.Terms, + Website: v.Meta.WebsiteRFC, + CAA: v.Meta.CAA, + } + return *c.dir, nil + } + // RFC compliant ACME CA. c.dir = &Directory{ - RegURL: v.Reg, - AuthzURL: v.Authz, - CertURL: v.Cert, - RevokeURL: v.Revoke, - Terms: v.Meta.Terms, - Website: v.Meta.Website, - CAA: v.Meta.CAA, + RegURL: v.RegRFC, + AuthzURL: v.AuthzRFC, + OrderURL: v.OrderRFC, + RevokeURL: v.RevokeRFC, + NonceURL: v.NonceRFC, + KeyChangeURL: v.KeyChangeRFC, + Terms: v.Meta.TermsRFC, + Website: v.Meta.WebsiteRFC, + CAA: v.Meta.CAARFC, + ExternalAccountRequired: v.Meta.ExternalAcctRFC, } return *c.dir, nil } @@ -176,6 +235,9 @@ func (c *Client) directoryURL() string { } // CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format. +// It is incompatible with RFC 8555. Callers should use CreateOrderCert when interfacing +// with an RFC-compliant CA. +// // The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate // with a different duration. // If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain. @@ -206,7 +268,7 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, req.NotAfter = now.Add(exp).Format(time.RFC3339) } - res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.CertURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, c.dir.CertURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) if err != nil { return nil, "", err } @@ -227,12 +289,22 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, // It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved, // context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received. // -// The returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate if the bundle argument is true. +// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contains the CA (issuer) +// certificate chain. // // FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large. // Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid // and has expected features. func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle) + } + + // Legacy non-authenticated GET request. res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -247,10 +319,15 @@ func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]by // For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized. // If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead. func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error { - if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { return err } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason) + } + // Legacy CA. body := &struct { Resource string `json:"resource"` Cert string `json:"certificate"` @@ -260,10 +337,7 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert), Reason: int(reason), } - if key == nil { - key = c.Key - } - res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + res, err := c.post(ctx, key, dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return err } @@ -275,20 +349,30 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, // during account registration. See Register method of Client for more details. func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true } -// Register creates a new account registration by following the "new-reg" flow. -// It returns the registered account. The account is not modified. +// Register creates a new account with the CA using c.Key. +// It returns the registered account. The account acct is not modified. // // The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's Terms of Service (TOS). // If so, and the account has not indicated the acceptance of the terms (see Account for details), // Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report // whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS. -func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, a *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) { - if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { +// +// When interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA, non-RFC 8555 fields of acct are ignored +// and prompt is called if Directory's Terms field is non-zero. +// Also see Error's Instance field for when a CA requires already registered accounts to agree +// to an updated Terms of Service. +func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { return nil, err } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt) + } - var err error - if a, err = c.doReg(ctx, c.dir.RegURL, "new-reg", a); err != nil { + // Legacy ACME draft registration flow. + a, err := c.doReg(ctx, dir.RegURL, "new-reg", acct) + if err != nil { return nil, err } var accept bool @@ -302,9 +386,20 @@ func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, a *Account, prompt func(tosURL st return a, err } -// GetReg retrieves an existing registration. -// The url argument is an Account URI. +// GetReg retrieves an existing account associated with c.Key. +// +// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC 8555 CAs. +// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA. func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.getRegRFC(ctx) + } + + // Legacy CA. a, err := c.doReg(ctx, url, "reg", nil) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -315,9 +410,21 @@ func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) { // UpdateReg updates an existing registration. // It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified. -func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) { - uri := a.URI - a, err := c.doReg(ctx, uri, "reg", a) +// +// When interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL +// associated with c.Key is used instead. +func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct) + } + + // Legacy CA. + uri := acct.URI + a, err := c.doReg(ctx, uri, "reg", acct) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -325,13 +432,21 @@ func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) { return a, nil } -// Authorize performs the initial step in an authorization flow. +// Authorize performs the initial step in the pre-authorization flow, +// as opposed to order-based flow. // The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned // challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization. // +// Once complete, the caller can use AuthorizeOrder which the CA +// should provision with the already satisfied authorization. +// For pre-RFC CAs, the caller can proceed directly to requesting a certificate +// using CreateCert method. +// // If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return -// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller -// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate. +// a valid authorization which has its Status field set to StatusValid. +// +// More about pre-authorization can be found at +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.4.1. func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) { return c.authorize(ctx, "dns", domain) } @@ -362,7 +477,7 @@ func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization Resource: "new-authz", Identifier: authzID{Type: typ, Value: val}, } - res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, c.dir.AuthzURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -383,7 +498,17 @@ func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization // If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final, // see the WaitAuthorization method. func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var res *http.Response + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + res, err = c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + } else { + res, err = c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + } if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -400,11 +525,16 @@ func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizati // The url argument is an Authorization.URI value. // // If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization -// using the Authorize method before being able to request a new certificate -// for the domain associated with the authorization. +// using the Authorize or AuthorizeOrder methods before being able to request +// a new certificate for the domain associated with the authorization. // // It does not revoke existing certificates. func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return err + } + req := struct { Resource string `json:"resource"` Status string `json:"status"` @@ -414,7 +544,7 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { Status: "deactivated", Delete: true, } - res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return err } @@ -430,8 +560,18 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { // In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error. // If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError. func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + getfn := c.postAsGet + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + getfn = c.get + } + for { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -474,10 +614,21 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat // // A client typically polls a challenge status using this method. func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } + + getfn := c.postAsGet + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + getfn = c.get + } + res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() v := wireChallenge{URI: url} if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { @@ -491,21 +642,29 @@ func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, erro // // The server will then perform the validation asynchronously. func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) { - auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token) + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } - req := struct { - Resource string `json:"resource"` - Type string `json:"type"` - Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"` - }{ - Resource: "challenge", - Type: chal.Type, - Auth: auth, + var req interface{} = json.RawMessage("{}") // RFC-compliant CA + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + req = struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Type string `json:"type"` + Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"` + }{ + Resource: "challenge", + Type: chal.Type, + Auth: auth, + } } - res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, chal.URI, req, wantStatus( + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, req, wantStatus( http.StatusOK, // according to the spec http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt: see https://goo.gl/WsJ7VT (acme-divergences.md) )) @@ -555,21 +714,8 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string { } // TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response. -// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control -// over a domain name. -// -// The implementation is incomplete in that the returned value is a single certificate, -// computed only for Z0 of the key authorization. ACME CAs are expected to update -// their implementations to use the newer version, TLS-SNI-02. -// For more details on TLS-SNI-01 see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-01#section-7.3. -// -// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. -// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, -// and the public part is used to specify the signee. -// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // -// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name of the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. +// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec. func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) if err != nil { @@ -586,17 +732,8 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl } // TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response. -// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control -// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-SNI-02 see -// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-7.3. -// -// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. -// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, -// and the public part is used to specify the signee. -// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // -// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. +// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec. func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) @@ -663,7 +800,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption) return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt) } -// doReg sends all types of registration requests. +// doReg sends all types of registration requests the old way (pre-RFC world). // The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource" // in the ACME spec terms. // @@ -682,7 +819,7 @@ func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Accoun req.Contact = acct.Contact req.Agreement = acct.AgreedTerms } - res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, url, req, wantStatus( + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus( http.StatusOK, // updates and deletes http.StatusCreated, // new account creation http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt divergent implementation @@ -721,12 +858,16 @@ func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Accoun } // popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce -// or fetches a fresh one from a URL by issuing a HEAD request. -// It first tries c.directoryURL() and then the provided url if the former fails. +// or fetches a fresh one from c.dir.NonceURL. +// If NonceURL is empty, it first tries c.directoryURL() and, failing that, +// the provided url. func (c *Client) popNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) { c.noncesMu.Lock() defer c.noncesMu.Unlock() if len(c.nonces) == 0 { + if c.dir != nil && c.dir.NonceURL != "" { + return c.fetchNonce(ctx, c.dir.NonceURL) + } dirURL := c.directoryURL() v, err := c.fetchNonce(ctx, dirURL) if err != nil && url != dirURL { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go index 70ab355f..2ea9e231 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ import ( "golang.org/x/net/idna" ) +// DefaultACMEDirectory is the default ACME Directory URL used when the Manager's Client is nil. +const DefaultACMEDirectory = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + // createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state // entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call. // This is a variable instead of a const for testing. @@ -88,9 +91,9 @@ func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error { } // Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client. -// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-alpn-01", -// "tls-sni-01", "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, -// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config. +// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-alpn-01" +// or "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them to a TLS server +// via tls.Config. // // You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache, // to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts. @@ -135,9 +138,10 @@ type Manager struct { // Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration // and requesting new certificates. // - // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL - // as directory endpoint. If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is - // generated and, if Cache is not nil, stored in cache. + // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with DefaultACMEDirectory + // as the directory endpoint. + // If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is generated and, + // if Cache is not nil, stored in cache. // // Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect. Client *acme.Client @@ -174,8 +178,8 @@ type Manager struct { renewalMu sync.Mutex renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal - // tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens. - tokensMu sync.RWMutex + // challengeMu guards tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens. + challengeMu sync.RWMutex // tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type // during the authorization flow. tryHTTP01 bool @@ -184,12 +188,11 @@ type Manager struct { // to be provisioned. // The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow. httpTokens map[string][]byte - // certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni and tls-alpn challenges - // and is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name of ClientHello. - // Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix for tls-sni. Otherwise, they are domain names - // for tls-alpn. + // certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-alpn-01 challenges + // and is keyed by the domain name which matches the ClientHello server name. // The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow. certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate + // nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for // testing purposes. nowFunc func() time.Time @@ -226,7 +229,7 @@ func (m *Manager) TLSConfig() *tls.Config { // GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook. // It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering -// tls-alpn-01 and *.acme.invalid (tls-sni-01 and tls-sni-02) challenges. +// tls-alpn-01 challenges. // All other fields of hello are ignored. // // If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting @@ -235,9 +238,7 @@ func (m *Manager) TLSConfig() *tls.Config { // This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details. // // If GetCertificate is used directly, instead of via Manager.TLSConfig, package users will -// also have to add acme.ALPNProto to NextProtos for tls-alpn-01, or use HTTPHandler -// for http-01. (The tls-sni-* challenges have been deprecated by popular ACME providers -// due to security issues in the ecosystem.) +// also have to add acme.ALPNProto to NextProtos for tls-alpn-01, or use HTTPHandler for http-01. func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) { if m.Prompt == nil { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set") @@ -269,13 +270,10 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute) defer cancel() - // Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI or TLS-ALPN challenge. + // Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-ALPN challenge. if wantsTokenCert(hello) { - m.tokensMu.RLock() - defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock() - // It's ok to use the same token cert key for both tls-sni and tls-alpn - // because there's always at most 1 token cert per on-going domain authorization. - // See m.verify for details. + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil { return cert, nil } @@ -318,8 +316,7 @@ func wantsTokenCert(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { if len(hello.SupportedProtos) == 1 && hello.SupportedProtos[0] == acme.ALPNProto { return true } - // tls-sni-xx - return strings.HasSuffix(hello.ServerName, ".acme.invalid") + return false } func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { @@ -384,8 +381,8 @@ func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { // If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01" // challenge for domain verification. func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() m.tryHTTP01 = true if fallback == nil { @@ -648,71 +645,64 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) { // authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success. // The key argument is the certificate private key. func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { - client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) + + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - leaf, err = validCert(ck, der, key, m.now()) + dir, err := client.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - return der, leaf, nil -} -// revokePendingAuthz revokes all authorizations idenfied by the elements of uri slice. -// It ignores revocation errors. -func (m *Manager) revokePendingAuthz(ctx context.Context, uri []string) { - client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) - if err != nil { - return + var chain [][]byte + switch { + // Pre-RFC legacy CA. + case dir.OrderURL == "": + if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + der, _, err := client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + chain = der + // RFC 8555 compliant CA. + default: + o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + der, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + chain = der } - for _, u := range uri { - client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u) + leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err } + return chain, leaf, nil } -// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow +// verify runs the identifier (domain) pre-authorization flow for legacy CAs // using each applicable ACME challenge type. func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error { - // The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill - // in this specific order. - challengeTypes := []string{"tls-alpn-01", "tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"} - m.tokensMu.RLock() - if m.tryHTTP01 { - challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01") - } - m.tokensMu.RUnlock() - - // Keep track of pending authzs and revoke the ones that did not validate. - pendingAuthzs := make(map[string]bool) + // Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas + // after we're done. + var authzURLs []string defer func() { - var uri []string - for k, pending := range pendingAuthzs { - if pending { - uri = append(uri, k) - } - } - if len(uri) > 0 { - // Use "detached" background context. - // The revocations need not happen in the current verification flow. - go m.revokePendingAuthz(context.Background(), uri) - } + go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(authzURLs) }() // errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error) + challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes() var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try for { // Start domain authorization and get the challenge. @@ -720,6 +710,7 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string if err != nil { return err } + authzURLs = append(authzURLs, authz.URI) // No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status // is in a final state. switch authz.Status { @@ -729,8 +720,6 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI) } - pendingAuthzs[authz.URI] = true - // Pick the next preferred challenge. var chal *acme.Challenge for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { @@ -760,11 +749,126 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string errs[chal] = err continue } - delete(pendingAuthzs, authz.URI) return nil } } +// verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs +// using each applicable ACME challenge type. +func (m *Manager) verifyRFC(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) (*acme.Order, error) { + // Try each supported challenge type starting with a new order each time. + // The nextTyp index of the next challenge type to try is shared across + // all order authorizations: if we've tried a challenge type once and it didn't work, + // it will most likely not work on another order's authorization either. + challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes() + nextTyp := 0 // challengeTypes index +AuthorizeOrderLoop: + for { + o, err := client.AuthorizeOrder(ctx, acme.DomainIDs(domain)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas + // after we're done. + defer func(urls []string) { + go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(urls) + }(o.AuthzURLs) + + // Check if there's actually anything we need to do. + switch o.Status { + case acme.StatusReady: + // Already authorized. + return o, nil + case acme.StatusPending: + // Continue normal Order-based flow. + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid new order status %q; order URL: %q", o.Status, o.URI) + } + + // Satisfy all pending authorizations. + for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs { + z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, zurl) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if z.Status != acme.StatusPending { + // We are interested only in pending authorizations. + continue + } + // Pick the next preferred challenge. + var chal *acme.Challenge + for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { + chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], z.Challenges) + nextTyp++ + } + if chal == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to satisfy %q for domain %q: no viable challenge type found", z.URI, domain) + } + // Respond to the challenge and wait for validation result. + cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain) + if err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + defer cleanup() + if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, z.URI); err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + } + + // All authorizations are satisfied. + // Wait for the CA to update the order status. + o, err = client.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI) + if err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + return o, nil + } +} + +func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge { + for _, c := range chal { + if c.Type == typ { + return c + } + } + return nil +} + +func (m *Manager) supportedChallengeTypes() []string { + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() + typ := []string{"tls-alpn-01"} + if m.tryHTTP01 { + typ = append(typ, "http-01") + } + return typ +} + +// deactivatePendingAuthz relinquishes all authorizations identified by the elements +// of the provided uri slice which are in "pending" state. +// It ignores revocation errors. +// +// deactivatePendingAuthz takes no context argument and instead runs with its own +// "detached" context because deactivations are done in a goroutine separate from +// that of the main issuance or renewal flow. +func (m *Manager) deactivatePendingAuthz(uri []string) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) + if err != nil { + return + } + for _, u := range uri { + z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, u) + if err == nil && z.Status == acme.StatusPending { + client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u) + } + } +} + // fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal. // The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded. func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) { @@ -776,20 +880,6 @@ func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.C } m.putCertToken(ctx, domain, &cert) return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(domain) }, nil - case "tls-sni-01": - cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert) - return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil - case "tls-sni-02": - cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - m.putCertToken(ctx, name, &cert) - return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(name) }, nil case "http-01": resp, err := client.HTTP01ChallengeResponse(chal.Token) if err != nil { @@ -802,20 +892,11 @@ func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.C return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type) } -func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge { - for _, c := range chal { - if c.Type == typ { - return c - } - } - return nil -} - // putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name // in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() if m.certTokens == nil { m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate) } @@ -826,8 +907,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certi // deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name // from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() delete(m.certTokens, name) if m.Cache != nil { ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true} @@ -838,8 +919,8 @@ func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) { // httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map // or the optional cache. func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) { - m.tokensMu.RLock() - defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock() + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok { return v, nil } @@ -854,8 +935,8 @@ func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, erro // // It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put. func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() if m.httpTokens == nil { m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte) } @@ -871,8 +952,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) { // // If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout. func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath) if m.Cache != nil { m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath)) @@ -971,7 +1052,7 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) { client := m.Client if client == nil { - client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL} + client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: DefaultACMEDirectory} } if client.Key == nil { var err error @@ -989,14 +1070,23 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) { } a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact} _, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt) - if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict { - // conflict indicates the key is already registered + if err == nil || isAccountAlreadyExist(err) { m.client = client err = nil } return m.client, err } +// isAccountAlreadyExist reports whether the err, as returned from acme.Client.Register, +// indicates the account has already been registered. +func isAccountAlreadyExist(err error) bool { + if err == acme.ErrAccountAlreadyExists { + return true + } + ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error) + return ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict +} + func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy { if m.HostPolicy != nil { return m.HostPolicy diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go index aa9aa845..03f63022 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ func (d DirCache) Put(ctx context.Context, name string, data []byte) error { if tmp, err = d.writeTempFile(name, data); err != nil { return } + defer os.Remove(tmp) select { case <-ctx.Done(): // Don't overwrite the file if the context was canceled. @@ -116,12 +117,17 @@ func (d DirCache) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error { } // writeTempFile writes b to a temporary file, closes the file and returns its path. -func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (string, error) { +func (d DirCache) writeTempFile(prefix string, b []byte) (name string, reterr error) { // TempFile uses 0600 permissions f, err := ioutil.TempFile(string(d), prefix) if err != nil { return "", err } + defer func() { + if reterr != nil { + os.Remove(f.Name()) + } + }() if _, err := f.Write(b); err != nil { f.Close() return "", err diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go index 600d5798..c51943e7 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go @@ -155,8 +155,16 @@ func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Respons } } +// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC8555 +// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3. +// It makes a POST request in KID form with zero JWS payload. +// See nopayload doc comments in jws.go. +func (c *Client) postAsGet(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) { + return c.post(ctx, nil, url, noPayload, ok) +} + // post issues a signed POST request in JWS format using the provided key -// to the specified URL. +// to the specified URL. If key is nil, c.Key is used instead. // It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true. // // post retries unsuccessful attempts according to c.RetryBackoff @@ -193,14 +201,28 @@ func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body i } // postNoRetry signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url. -// The body argument must be JSON-serializable. // It is used by c.post to retry unsuccessful attempts. +// The body argument must be JSON-serializable. +// +// If key argument is nil, c.Key is used to sign the request. +// If key argument is nil and c.accountKID returns a non-zero keyID, +// the request is sent in KID form. Otherwise, JWK form is used. +// +// In practice, when interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form +// and JWK is used only when KID is unavailable: new account endpoint and certificate +// revocation requests authenticated by a cert key. +// See jwsEncodeJSON for other details. func (c *Client) postNoRetry(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, *http.Request, error) { + kid := noKeyID + if key == nil { + key = c.Key + kid = c.accountKID(ctx) + } nonce, err := c.popNonce(ctx, url) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, nonce) + b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, kid, nonce, url) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go index 1093b503..76e3fdac 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go @@ -11,31 +11,60 @@ import ( "crypto/rsa" "crypto/sha256" _ "crypto/sha512" // need for EC keys + "encoding/asn1" "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" "fmt" "math/big" ) +// keyID is the account identity provided by a CA during registration. +type keyID string + +// noKeyID indicates that jwsEncodeJSON should compute and use JWK instead of a KID. +// See jwsEncodeJSON for details. +const noKeyID = keyID("") + +// noPayload indicates jwsEncodeJSON will encode zero-length octet string +// in a JWS request. This is called POST-as-GET in RFC 8555 and is used to make +// authenticated GET requests via POSTing with an empty payload. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3 for more details. +const noPayload = "" + // jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce. -// The result is serialized in JSON format. +// The result is serialized in JSON format containing either kid or jwk +// fields based on the provided keyID value. +// +// If kid is non-empty, its quoted value is inserted in the protected head +// as "kid" field value. Otherwise, JWK is computed using jwkEncode and inserted +// as "jwk" field value. The "jwk" and "kid" fields are mutually exclusive. +// // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#section-7. -func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, nonce string) ([]byte, error) { - jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public()) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } +func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, url string) ([]byte, error) { alg, sha := jwsHasher(key.Public()) if alg == "" || !sha.Available() { return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey } - phead := fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce) + var phead string + switch kid { + case noKeyID: + jwk, err := jwkEncode(key.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"jwk":%s,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, jwk, nonce, url) + default: + phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"kid":%q,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, kid, nonce, url) + } phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead)) - cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset) - if err != nil { - return nil, err + var payload string + if claimset != noPayload { + cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs) } - payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs) hash := sha.New() hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload)) sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil)) @@ -98,21 +127,23 @@ func jwkEncode(pub crypto.PublicKey) (string, error) { // jwsSign signs the digest using the given key. // The hash is unused for ECDSA keys. -// -// Note: non-stdlib crypto.Signer implementations are expected to return -// the signature in the format as specified in RFC7518. -// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518 for more details. func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) { - if key, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey); ok { - // The key.Sign method of ecdsa returns ASN1-encoded signature. - // So, we use the package Sign function instead - // to get R and S values directly and format the result accordingly. - r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand.Reader, key, digest) + switch pub := key.Public().(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash) + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + sigASN1, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash) if err != nil { return nil, err } - rb, sb := r.Bytes(), s.Bytes() - size := key.Params().BitSize / 8 + + var rs struct{ R, S *big.Int } + if _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(sigASN1, &rs); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + rb, sb := rs.R.Bytes(), rs.S.Bytes() + size := pub.Params().BitSize / 8 if size%8 > 0 { size++ } @@ -121,7 +152,7 @@ func jwsSign(key crypto.Signer, hash crypto.Hash, digest []byte) ([]byte, error) copy(sig[size*2-len(sb):], sb) return sig, nil } - return key.Sign(rand.Reader, digest, hash) + return nil, ErrUnsupportedKey } // jwsHasher indicates suitable JWS algorithm name and a hash function diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..dfb57a66 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package acme + +import ( + "context" + "crypto" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/json" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "io/ioutil" + "net/http" + "time" +) + +// DeactivateReg permanently disables an existing account associated with c.Key. +// A deactivated account can no longer request certificate issuance or access +// resources related to the account, such as orders or authorizations. +// +// It only works with CAs implementing RFC 8555. +func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error { + url := string(c.accountKID(ctx)) + if url == "" { + return ErrNoAccount + } + req := json.RawMessage(`{"status": "deactivated"}`) + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return err + } + res.Body.Close() + return nil +} + +// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. +// It expects c.Discover to have already been called. +// TODO: Implement externalAccountBinding. +func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) { + c.cacheMu.Lock() // guard c.kid access + defer c.cacheMu.Unlock() + + req := struct { + TermsAgreed bool `json:"termsOfServiceAgreed,omitempty"` + Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"` + }{ + Contact: acct.Contact, + } + if c.dir.Terms != "" { + req.TermsAgreed = prompt(c.dir.Terms) + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.RegURL, req, wantStatus( + http.StatusOK, // account with this key already registered + http.StatusCreated, // new account created + )) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + defer res.Body.Close() + a, err := responseAccount(res) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Cache Account URL even if we return an error to the caller. + // It is by all means a valid and usable "kid" value for future requests. + c.kid = keyID(a.URI) + if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { + return nil, ErrAccountAlreadyExists + } + return a, nil +} + +// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. +// It expects c.Discover to have already been called. +func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) { + url := string(c.accountKID(ctx)) + if url == "" { + return nil, ErrNoAccount + } + req := struct { + Contact []string `json:"contact,omitempty"` + }{ + Contact: a.Contact, + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseAccount(res) +} + +// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. +// It expects c.Discover to have already been called. +func (c *Client) getRegRFC(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) { + req := json.RawMessage(`{"onlyReturnExisting": true}`) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.RegURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if e, ok := err.(*Error); ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist" { + return nil, ErrNoAccount + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseAccount(res) +} + +func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) { + var v struct { + Status string + Contact []string + Orders string + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid account response: %v", err) + } + return &Account{ + URI: res.Header.Get("Location"), + Status: v.Status, + Contact: v.Contact, + OrdersURL: v.Orders, + }, nil +} + +// AuthorizeOrder initiates the order-based application for certificate issuance, +// as opposed to pre-authorization in Authorize. +// It is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. +// +// The caller then needs to fetch each authorization with GetAuthorization, +// identify those with StatusPending status and fulfill a challenge using Accept. +// Once all authorizations are satisfied, the caller will typically want to poll +// order status using WaitOrder until it's in StatusReady state. +// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateOrderCert. +func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderOption) (*Order, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + req := struct { + Identifiers []wireAuthzID `json:"identifiers"` + NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"` + NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"` + }{} + for _, v := range id { + req.Identifiers = append(req.Identifiers, wireAuthzID{ + Type: v.Type, + Value: v.Value, + }) + } + for _, o := range opt { + switch o := o.(type) { + case orderNotBeforeOpt: + req.NotBefore = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339) + case orderNotAfterOpt: + req.NotAfter = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339) + default: + // Package's fault if we let this happen. + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported order option type %T", o)) + } + } + + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.OrderURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseOrder(res) +} + +// GetOrder retrives an order identified by the given URL. +// For orders created with AuthorizeOrder, the url value is Order.URI. +// +// If a caller needs to poll an order until its status is final, +// see the WaitOrder method. +func (c *Client) GetOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseOrder(res) +} + +// WaitOrder polls an order from the given URL until it is in one of the final states, +// StatusReady, StatusValid or StatusInvalid, the CA responded with a non-retryable error +// or the context is done. +// +// It returns a non-nil Order only if its Status is StatusReady or StatusValid. +// In all other cases WaitOrder returns an error. +// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *OrderError. +func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + for { + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + o, err := responseOrder(res) + res.Body.Close() + switch { + case err != nil: + // Skip and retry. + case o.Status == StatusInvalid: + return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status} + case o.Status == StatusReady || o.Status == StatusValid: + return o, nil + } + + d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After")) + if d == 0 { + // Default retry-after. + // Same reasoning as in WaitAuthorization. + d = time.Second + } + t := time.NewTimer(d) + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + t.Stop() + return nil, ctx.Err() + case <-t.C: + // Retry. + } + } +} + +func responseOrder(res *http.Response) (*Order, error) { + var v struct { + Status string + Expires time.Time + Identifiers []wireAuthzID + NotBefore time.Time + NotAfter time.Time + Error *wireError + Authorizations []string + Finalize string + Certificate string + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: error reading order: %v", err) + } + o := &Order{ + URI: res.Header.Get("Location"), + Status: v.Status, + Expires: v.Expires, + NotBefore: v.NotBefore, + NotAfter: v.NotAfter, + AuthzURLs: v.Authorizations, + FinalizeURL: v.Finalize, + CertURL: v.Certificate, + } + for _, id := range v.Identifiers { + o.Identifiers = append(o.Identifiers, AuthzID{Type: id.Type, Value: id.Value}) + } + if v.Error != nil { + o.Error = v.Error.error(nil /* headers */) + } + return o, nil +} + +// CreateOrderCert submits the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA at the specified URL. +// The URL is the FinalizeURL field of an Order created with AuthorizeOrder. +// +// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contain the CA (issuer) +// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned. +// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert. +// +// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs. +// +// CreateOrderCert returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large. +// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features. +func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID + return nil, "", err + } + + // RFC describes this as "finalize order" request. + req := struct { + CSR string `json:"csr"` + }{ + CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr), + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + o, err := responseOrder(res) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + + // Wait for CA to issue the cert if they haven't. + if o.Status != StatusValid { + o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + // The only acceptable status post finalize and WaitOrder is "valid". + if o.Status != StatusValid { + return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status} + } + crt, err := c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, o.CertURL, bundle) + return crt, o.CertURL, err +} + +// fetchCertRFC downloads issued certificate from the given URL. +// It expects the CA to respond with PEM-encoded certificate chain. +// +// The URL argument is the CertURL field of Order. +func (c *Client) fetchCertRFC(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + + // Get all the bytes up to a sane maximum. + // Account very roughly for base64 overhead. + const max = maxCertChainSize + maxCertChainSize/33 + b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: fetch cert response stream: %v", err) + } + if len(b) > max { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too big") + } + + // Decode PEM chain. + var chain [][]byte + for { + var p *pem.Block + p, b = pem.Decode(b) + if p == nil { + break + } + if p.Type != "CERTIFICATE" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid PEM cert type %q", p.Type) + } + + chain = append(chain, p.Bytes) + if !bundle { + return chain, nil + } + if len(chain) > maxChainLen { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too long") + } + } + if len(chain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is empty") + } + return chain, nil +} + +// sends a cert revocation request in either JWK form when key is non-nil or KID form otherwise. +func (c *Client) revokeCertRFC(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error { + req := &struct { + Cert string `json:"certificate"` + Reason int `json:"reason"` + }{ + Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert), + Reason: int(reason), + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + if isAlreadyRevoked(err) { + // Assume it is not an error to revoke an already revoked cert. + return nil + } + return err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return nil +} + +func isAlreadyRevoked(err error) bool { + e, ok := err.(*Error) + return ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked" +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go index 54792c06..9c59097a 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go @@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ import ( "time" ) -// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states. +// ACME status values of Account, Order, Authorization and Challenge objects. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6 for details. const ( - StatusUnknown = "unknown" - StatusPending = "pending" - StatusProcessing = "processing" - StatusValid = "valid" - StatusInvalid = "invalid" - StatusRevoked = "revoked" + StatusDeactivated = "deactivated" + StatusExpired = "expired" + StatusInvalid = "invalid" + StatusPending = "pending" + StatusProcessing = "processing" + StatusReady = "ready" + StatusRevoked = "revoked" + StatusUnknown = "unknown" + StatusValid = "valid" ) // CRLReasonCode identifies the reason for a certificate revocation. @@ -41,8 +45,17 @@ const ( CRLReasonAACompromise CRLReasonCode = 10 ) -// ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered. -var ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported") +var ( + // ErrUnsupportedKey is returned when an unsupported key type is encountered. + ErrUnsupportedKey = errors.New("acme: unknown key type; only RSA and ECDSA are supported") + + // ErrAccountAlreadyExists indicates that the Client's key has already been registered + // with the CA. It is returned by Register method. + ErrAccountAlreadyExists = errors.New("acme: account already exists") + + // ErrNoAccount indicates that the Client's key has not been registered with the CA. + ErrNoAccount = errors.New("acme: account does not exist") +) // Error is an ACME error, defined in Problem Details for HTTP APIs doc // http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-appsawg-http-problem. @@ -54,6 +67,12 @@ type Error struct { ProblemType string // Detail is a human-readable explanation specific to this occurrence of the problem. Detail string + // Instance indicates a URL that the client should direct a human user to visit + // in order for instructions on how to agree to the updated Terms of Service. + // In such an event CA sets StatusCode to 403, ProblemType to + // "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:userActionRequired" and a Link header with relation + // "terms-of-service" containing the latest TOS URL. + Instance string // Header is the original server error response headers. // It may be nil. Header http.Header @@ -86,6 +105,21 @@ func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; ")) } +// OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods. +// It indicates the order is unusable and the clients should start over with +// AuthorizeOrder. +// +// The clients can still fetch the order object from CA using GetOrder +// to inspect its state. +type OrderError struct { + OrderURL string + Status string +} + +func (oe *OrderError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("acme: order %s status: %s", oe.OrderURL, oe.Status) +} + // RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and // any Retry-After duration returned by the server. // @@ -108,49 +142,88 @@ func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) { } // Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key. +// Non-RFC 8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA. type Account struct { // URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve // account data from the CA. + // When interfacing with RFC 8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field + // value in JWS signed requests. URI string // Contact is a slice of contact info used during registration. + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.3 for supported + // formats. Contact []string + // Status indicates current account status as returned by the CA. + // Possible values are StatusValid, StatusDeactivated, and StatusRevoked. + Status string + + // OrdersURL is a URL from which a list of orders submitted by this account + // can be fetched. + OrdersURL string + // The terms user has agreed to. // A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed // to the actual Terms of Service of the CA. + // + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to + // during Client's Register call in the prompt callback function. AgreedTerms string // Actual terms of a CA. + // + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field. + // When a CA updates their terms and requires an account agreement, + // a URL at which instructions to do so is available in Error's Instance field. CurrentTerms string // Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow. + // + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL. Authz string // Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations // granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request. + // + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. Authorizations string // Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates // issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request. + // + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. Certificates string } // Directory is ACME server discovery data. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.1 for more details. type Directory struct { - // RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new - // and modifying existing accounts. + // NonceURL indicates an endpoint where to fetch fresh nonce values from. + NonceURL string + + // RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new accounts. + // Pre-RFC 8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL. RegURL string - // AuthzURL is used to initiate Identifier Authorization flow. + // OrderURL is used to initiate the certificate issuance flow + // as described in RFC 8555. + OrderURL string + + // AuthzURL is used to initiate identifier pre-authorization flow. + // Empty string indicates the flow is unsupported by the CA. AuthzURL string // CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL. CertURL string // RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow. RevokeURL string + // KeyChangeURL allows to perform account key rollover flow. + KeyChangeURL string + // Term is a URI identifying the current terms of service. Terms string @@ -162,44 +235,126 @@ type Directory struct { // recognises as referring to itself for the purposes of CAA record validation // as defined in RFC6844. CAA []string + + // ExternalAccountRequired indicates that the CA requires for all account-related + // requests to include external account binding information. + ExternalAccountRequired bool } -// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge. -// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization -// with StatusInvalid. -type Challenge struct { - // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01". - Type string +// rfcCompliant reports whether the ACME server implements RFC 8555. +// Note that some servers may have incomplete RFC implementation +// even if the returned value is true. +// If rfcCompliant reports false, the server most likely implements draft-02. +func (d *Directory) rfcCompliant() bool { + return d.OrderURL != "" +} - // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to. +// Order represents a client's request for a certificate. +// It tracks the request flow progress through to issuance. +type Order struct { + // URI uniquely identifies an order. URI string - // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. - Token string - - // Status identifies the status of this challenge. + // Status represents the current status of the order. + // It indicates which action the client should take. + // + // Possible values are StatusPending, StatusReady, StatusProcessing, StatusValid and StatusInvalid. + // Pending means the CA does not believe that the client has fulfilled the requirements. + // Ready indicates that the client has fulfilled all the requirements and can submit a CSR + // to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateOrderCert. + // Processing means the certificate is being issued. + // Valid indicates the CA has issued the certificate. It can be downloaded + // from the Order's CertURL. This is done with Client's FetchCert. + // Invalid means the certificate will not be issued. Users should consider this order + // abandoned. Status string - // Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure - // when this challenge was used. - // The type of a non-nil value is *Error. - Error error + // Expires is the timestamp after which CA considers this order invalid. + Expires time.Time + + // Identifiers contains all identifier objects which the order pertains to. + Identifiers []AuthzID + + // NotBefore is the requested value of the notBefore field in the certificate. + NotBefore time.Time + + // NotAfter is the requested value of the notAfter field in the certificate. + NotAfter time.Time + + // AuthzURLs represents authorizations to complete before a certificate + // for identifiers specified in the order can be issued. + // It also contains unexpired authorizations that the client has completed + // in the past. + // + // Authorization objects can be fetched using Client's GetAuthorization method. + // + // The required authorizations are dictated by CA policies. + // There may not be a 1:1 relationship between the identifiers and required authorizations. + // Required authorizations can be identified by their StatusPending status. + // + // For orders in the StatusValid or StatusInvalid state these are the authorizations + // which were completed. + AuthzURLs []string + + // FinalizeURL is the endpoint at which a CSR is submitted to obtain a certificate + // once all the authorizations are satisfied. + FinalizeURL string + + // CertURL points to the certificate that has been issued in response to this order. + CertURL string + + // The error that occurred while processing the order as received from a CA, if any. + Error *Error +} + +// OrderOption allows customizing Client.AuthorizeOrder call. +type OrderOption interface { + privateOrderOpt() +} + +// WithOrderNotBefore sets order's NotBefore field. +func WithOrderNotBefore(t time.Time) OrderOption { + return orderNotBeforeOpt(t) } +// WithOrderNotAfter sets order's NotAfter field. +func WithOrderNotAfter(t time.Time) OrderOption { + return orderNotAfterOpt(t) +} + +type orderNotBeforeOpt time.Time + +func (orderNotBeforeOpt) privateOrderOpt() {} + +type orderNotAfterOpt time.Time + +func (orderNotAfterOpt) privateOrderOpt() {} + // Authorization encodes an authorization response. type Authorization struct { // URI uniquely identifies a authorization. URI string - // Status identifies the status of an authorization. + // Status is the current status of an authorization. + // Possible values are StatusPending, StatusValid, StatusInvalid, StatusDeactivated, + // StatusExpired and StatusRevoked. Status string // Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent. Identifier AuthzID + // The timestamp after which the CA considers the authorization invalid. + Expires time.Time + + // Wildcard is true for authorizations of a wildcard domain name. + Wildcard bool + // Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession // of the identifier (for pending authorizations). - // For final authorizations, the challenges that were used. + // For valid authorizations, the challenge that was validated. + // For invalid authorizations, the challenge that was attempted and failed. + // + // RFC 8555 compatible CAs require users to fuflfill only one of the challenges. Challenges []*Challenge // A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient @@ -207,24 +362,51 @@ type Authorization struct { // Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set. // Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array. // If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges. + // + // This field is unused in RFC 8555. Combinations [][]int } // AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent. type AuthzID struct { - Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns". + Type string // The type of identifier, "dns" or "ip". Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org". } +// DomainIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "dns" identifier type. +func DomainIDs(names ...string) []AuthzID { + a := make([]AuthzID, len(names)) + for i, v := range names { + a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: v} + } + return a +} + +// IPIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "ip" identifier type. +// Each element of addr is textual form of an address as defined +// in RFC1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC5952 Section 4 for IPv6. +func IPIDs(addr ...string) []AuthzID { + a := make([]AuthzID, len(addr)) + for i, v := range addr { + a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "ip", Value: v} + } + return a +} + +// wireAuthzID is ACME JSON representation of authorization identifier objects. +type wireAuthzID struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Value string `json:"value"` +} + // wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects. type wireAuthz struct { + Identifier wireAuthzID Status string + Expires time.Time + Wildcard bool Challenges []wireChallenge Combinations [][]int - Identifier struct { - Type string - Value string - } } func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization { @@ -232,8 +414,10 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization { URI: uri, Status: z.Status, Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value}, - Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy + Expires: z.Expires, + Wildcard: z.Wildcard, Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)), + Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy } for i, v := range z.Challenges { a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge() @@ -254,22 +438,55 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError { return err } +// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge. +// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization +// with StatusInvalid. +type Challenge struct { + // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-alpn-01", "dns-01". + Type string + + // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to. + URI string + + // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. + Token string + + // Status identifies the status of this challenge. + // In RFC 8555, possible values are StatusPending, StatusProcessing, StatusValid, + // and StatusInvalid. + Status string + + // Validated is the time at which the CA validated this challenge. + // Always zero value in pre-RFC 8555. + Validated time.Time + + // Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure + // when this challenge was used. + // The type of a non-nil value is *Error. + Error error +} + // wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation. type wireChallenge struct { - URI string `json:"uri"` - Type string - Token string - Status string - Error *wireError + URL string `json:"url"` // RFC + URI string `json:"uri"` // pre-RFC + Type string + Token string + Status string + Validated time.Time + Error *wireError } func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge { v := &Challenge{ - URI: c.URI, + URI: c.URL, Type: c.Type, Token: c.Token, Status: c.Status, } + if v.URI == "" { + v.URI = c.URI // c.URL was empty; use legacy + } if v.Status == "" { v.Status = StatusPending } @@ -282,9 +499,10 @@ func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge { // wireError is a subset of fields of the Problem Details object // as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7807#section-3.1. type wireError struct { - Status int - Type string - Detail string + Status int + Type string + Detail string + Instance string } func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error { @@ -292,6 +510,7 @@ func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error { StatusCode: e.Status, ProblemType: e.Type, Detail: e.Detail, + Instance: e.Instance, Header: h, } } |