diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go')
| -rw-r--r-- | vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go | 126 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 91 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go index c7fbc54c..1858184e 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute // pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use. var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand +var errPreRFC = errors.New("autocert: ACME server doesn't support RFC 8555") + func init() { src := mathrand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano()) pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)} @@ -456,7 +458,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error leaf: cert.Leaf, } m.state[ck] = s - go m.renew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter) + go m.startRenew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter) return cert, nil } @@ -582,8 +584,9 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, if err != nil { // Remove the failed state after some time, // making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello. + didRemove := testDidRemoveState // The lifetime of this timer is untracked, so copy mutable local state to avoid races. time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() { - defer testDidRemoveState(ck) + defer didRemove(ck) m.stateMu.Lock() defer m.stateMu.Unlock() // Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid @@ -601,7 +604,7 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, } state.cert = der state.leaf = leaf - go m.renew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter) + go m.startRenew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter) return state.tlscert() } @@ -658,99 +661,24 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck cert if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } + if dir.OrderURL == "" { + return nil, nil, errPreRFC + } - var chain [][]byte - switch { - // Pre-RFC legacy CA. - case dir.OrderURL == "": - if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - der, _, err := client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - chain = der - // RFC 8555 compliant CA. - default: - o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - der, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - chain = der + o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err } - leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now()) + chain, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - return chain, leaf, nil -} - -// verify runs the identifier (domain) pre-authorization flow for legacy CAs -// using each applicable ACME challenge type. -func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error { - // Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas - // after we're done. - var authzURLs []string - defer func() { - go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(authzURLs) - }() - - // errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail - errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error) - challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes() - var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try - for { - // Start domain authorization and get the challenge. - authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain) - if err != nil { - return err - } - authzURLs = append(authzURLs, authz.URI) - // No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status - // is in a final state. - switch authz.Status { - case acme.StatusValid: - return nil // already authorized - case acme.StatusInvalid: - return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI) - } - - // Pick the next preferred challenge. - var chal *acme.Challenge - for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { - chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], authz.Challenges) - nextTyp++ - } - if chal == nil { - errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q", domain) - for chal, err := range errs { - errorMsg += fmt.Sprintf("; challenge %q failed with error: %v", chal.Type, err) - } - return errors.New(errorMsg) - } - cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain) - if err != nil { - errs[chal] = err - continue - } - defer cleanup() - if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil { - errs[chal] = err - continue - } - // A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate. - if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err != nil { - errs[chal] = err - continue - } - return nil + leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err } + return chain, leaf, nil } // verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs @@ -966,7 +894,7 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string { return path.Base(tokenPath) + "+http-01" } -// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain. +// startRenew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain. // // The loop is scheduled in two cases: // - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state) @@ -974,7 +902,7 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string { // // The key argument is a certificate private key. // The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter). -func (m *Manager) renew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) { +func (m *Manager) startRenew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) { m.renewalMu.Lock() defer m.renewalMu.Unlock() if m.renewal[ck] != nil { @@ -1200,6 +1128,10 @@ func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(ck.domain); err != nil { return nil, err } + // renew certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022 + if isRevokedLetsEncrypt(leaf) { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate was probably revoked by Let's Encrypt") + } // ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key and matches the certKey type switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) { case *rsa.PublicKey: @@ -1230,6 +1162,18 @@ func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf return leaf, nil } +// https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/2022-01-25-issue-with-tls-alpn-01-validation-method/170450 +var letsEncryptFixDeployTime = time.Date(2022, time.January, 26, 00, 48, 0, 0, time.UTC) + +// isRevokedLetsEncrypt returns whether the certificate is likely to be part of +// a batch of certificates revoked by Let's Encrypt in January 2022. This check +// can be safely removed from May 2022. +func isRevokedLetsEncrypt(cert *x509.Certificate) bool { + O := cert.Issuer.Organization + return len(O) == 1 && O[0] == "Let's Encrypt" && + cert.NotBefore.Before(letsEncryptFixDeployTime) +} + type lockedMathRand struct { sync.Mutex rnd *mathrand.Rand |