diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/golang.org/x/crypto')
32 files changed, 3050 insertions, 676 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go index 1f4fb69e..7df64764 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ package acme import ( - "bytes" "context" "crypto" "crypto/ecdsa" @@ -23,6 +22,8 @@ import ( "crypto/sha256" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" + "crypto/x509/pkix" + "encoding/asn1" "encoding/base64" "encoding/hex" "encoding/json" @@ -33,14 +34,26 @@ import ( "io/ioutil" "math/big" "net/http" - "strconv" "strings" "sync" "time" ) -// LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA. -const LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" +const ( + // LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA. + LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + + // ALPNProto is the ALPN protocol name used by a CA server when validating + // tls-alpn-01 challenges. + // + // Package users must ensure their servers can negotiate the ACME ALPN in + // order for tls-alpn-01 challenge verifications to succeed. + // See the crypto/tls package's Config.NextProtos field. + ALPNProto = "acme-tls/1" +) + +// idPeACMEIdentifierV1 is the OID for the ACME extension for the TLS-ALPN challenge. +var idPeACMEIdentifierV1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1} const ( maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain @@ -76,6 +89,22 @@ type Client struct { // will have no effect. DirectoryURL string + // RetryBackoff computes the duration after which the nth retry of a failed request + // should occur. The value of n for the first call on failure is 1. + // The values of r and resp are the request and response of the last failed attempt. + // If the returned value is negative or zero, no more retries are done and an error + // is returned to the caller of the original method. + // + // Requests which result in a 4xx client error are not retried, + // except for 400 Bad Request due to "bad nonce" errors and 429 Too Many Requests. + // + // If RetryBackoff is nil, a truncated exponential backoff algorithm + // with the ceiling of 10 seconds is used, where each subsequent retry n + // is done after either ("Retry-After" + jitter) or (2^n seconds + jitter), + // preferring the former if "Retry-After" header is found in the resp. + // The jitter is a random value up to 1 second. + RetryBackoff func(n int, r *http.Request, resp *http.Response) time.Duration + dirMu sync.Mutex // guards writes to dir dir *Directory // cached result of Client's Discover method @@ -99,15 +128,12 @@ func (c *Client) Discover(ctx context.Context) (Directory, error) { if dirURL == "" { dirURL = LetsEncryptURL } - res, err := c.get(ctx, dirURL) + res, err := c.get(ctx, dirURL, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return Directory{}, err } defer res.Body.Close() c.addNonce(res.Header) - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - return Directory{}, responseError(res) - } var v struct { Reg string `json:"new-reg"` @@ -166,14 +192,11 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, req.NotAfter = now.Add(exp).Format(time.RFC3339) } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.CertURL, req) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.CertURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) if err != nil { return nil, "", err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated { - return nil, "", responseError(res) - } curl := res.Header.Get("Location") // cert permanent URL if res.ContentLength == 0 { @@ -196,26 +219,11 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, // Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid // and has expected features. func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { - for { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode == http.StatusOK { - return c.responseCert(ctx, res, bundle) - } - if res.StatusCode > 299 { - return nil, responseError(res) - } - d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After"), 3*time.Second) - select { - case <-time.After(d): - // retry - case <-ctx.Done(): - return nil, ctx.Err() - } + res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err } + return c.responseCert(ctx, res, bundle) } // RevokeCert revokes a previously issued certificate cert, provided in DER format. @@ -241,14 +249,11 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, if key == nil { key = c.Key } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body) + res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - return responseError(res) - } return nil } @@ -329,14 +334,11 @@ func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, Resource: "new-authz", Identifier: authzID{Type: "dns", Value: domain}, } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, c.dir.AuthzURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated { - return nil, responseError(res) - } var v wireAuthz if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { @@ -353,14 +355,11 @@ func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, // If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final, // see the WaitAuthorization method. func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url) + res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { - return nil, responseError(res) - } var v wireAuthz if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) @@ -387,14 +386,11 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { Status: "deactivated", Delete: true, } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, c.Key, url, req) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - return responseError(res) - } return nil } @@ -406,44 +402,42 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { // In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error. // If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError. func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { - sleep := sleeper(ctx) for { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url) + res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } - if res.StatusCode >= 400 && res.StatusCode <= 499 { - // Non-retriable error. For instance, Let's Encrypt may return 404 Not Found - // when requesting an expired authorization. - defer res.Body.Close() - return nil, responseError(res) - } - retry := res.Header.Get("Retry-After") - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { - res.Body.Close() - if err := sleep(retry, 1); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - continue - } var raw wireAuthz err = json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&raw) res.Body.Close() - if err != nil { - if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - continue - } - if raw.Status == StatusValid { + switch { + case err != nil: + // Skip and retry. + case raw.Status == StatusValid: return raw.authorization(url), nil - } - if raw.Status == StatusInvalid { + case raw.Status == StatusInvalid: return nil, raw.error(url) } - if err := sleep(retry, 0); err != nil { - return nil, err + + // Exponential backoff is implemented in c.get above. + // This is just to prevent continuously hitting the CA + // while waiting for a final authorization status. + d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After")) + if d == 0 { + // Given that the fastest challenges TLS-SNI and HTTP-01 + // require a CA to make at least 1 network round trip + // and most likely persist a challenge state, + // this default delay seems reasonable. + d = time.Second + } + t := time.NewTimer(d) + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + t.Stop() + return nil, ctx.Err() + case <-t.C: + // Retry. } } } @@ -452,14 +446,11 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat // // A client typically polls a challenge status using this method. func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url) + res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { - return nil, responseError(res) - } v := wireChallenge{URI: url} if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) @@ -486,16 +477,14 @@ func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error Type: chal.Type, Auth: auth, } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, c.Key, chal.URI, req) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, chal.URI, req, wantStatus( + http.StatusOK, // according to the spec + http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt: see https://goo.gl/WsJ7VT (acme-divergences.md) + )) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - // Note: the protocol specifies 200 as the expected response code, but - // letsencrypt seems to be returning 202. - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK && res.StatusCode != http.StatusAccepted { - return nil, responseError(res) - } var v wireChallenge if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { @@ -552,7 +541,7 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string { // If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // // The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name of the client hello matches exactly the returned name value. +// the server name of the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) if err != nil { @@ -579,7 +568,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl // If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // // The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name in the client hello matches exactly the returned name value. +// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) @@ -600,6 +589,52 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl return cert, sanA, nil } +// TLSALPN01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-ALPN-01 challenge response. +// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control +// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-ALPN-01 see +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-shoemaker-acme-tls-alpn-00#section-3 +// +// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. +// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, +// and the public part is used to specify the signee. +// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. +// +// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when +// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches the domain, and the special acme-tls/1 ALPN protocol +// has been specified. +func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, err error) { + ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + shasum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(ka)) + extValue, err := asn1.Marshal(shasum[:]) + if err != nil { + return tls.Certificate{}, err + } + acmeExtension := pkix.Extension{ + Id: idPeACMEIdentifierV1, + Critical: true, + Value: extValue, + } + + tmpl := defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate() + + var newOpt []CertOption + for _, o := range opt { + switch o := o.(type) { + case *certOptTemplate: + t := *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok + tmpl = &t + default: + newOpt = append(newOpt, o) + } + } + tmpl.ExtraExtensions = append(tmpl.ExtraExtensions, acmeExtension) + newOpt = append(newOpt, WithTemplate(tmpl)) + return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt) +} + // doReg sends all types of registration requests. // The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource" // in the ACME spec terms. @@ -619,14 +654,15 @@ func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Accoun req.Contact = acct.Contact req.Agreement = acct.AgreedTerms } - res, err := c.retryPostJWS(ctx, c.Key, url, req) + res, err := c.post(ctx, c.Key, url, req, wantStatus( + http.StatusOK, // updates and deletes + http.StatusCreated, // new account creation + http.StatusAccepted, // Let's Encrypt divergent implementation + )) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode > 299 { - return nil, responseError(res) - } var v struct { Contact []string @@ -656,59 +692,6 @@ func (c *Client) doReg(ctx context.Context, url string, typ string, acct *Accoun }, nil } -// retryPostJWS will retry calls to postJWS if there is a badNonce error, -// clearing the stored nonces after each error. -// If the response was 4XX-5XX, then responseError is called on the body, -// the body is closed, and the error returned. -func (c *Client) retryPostJWS(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, error) { - sleep := sleeper(ctx) - for { - res, err := c.postJWS(ctx, key, url, body) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - // handle errors 4XX-5XX with responseError - if res.StatusCode >= 400 && res.StatusCode <= 599 { - err := responseError(res) - res.Body.Close() - // according to spec badNonce is urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce - // however, acme servers in the wild return their version of the error - // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02#section-5.4 - if ae, ok := err.(*Error); ok && strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(ae.ProblemType), ":badnonce") { - // clear any nonces that we might've stored that might now be - // considered bad - c.clearNonces() - retry := res.Header.Get("Retry-After") - if err := sleep(retry, 1); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - continue - } - return nil, err - } - return res, nil - } -} - -// postJWS signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url. -// The body argument must be JSON-serializable. -func (c *Client) postJWS(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, error) { - nonce, err := c.popNonce(ctx, url) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, nonce) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - res, err := c.post(ctx, url, "application/jose+json", bytes.NewReader(b)) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - c.addNonce(res.Header) - return res, nil -} - // popNonce returns a nonce value previously stored with c.addNonce // or fetches a fresh one from the given URL. func (c *Client) popNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) { @@ -749,58 +732,12 @@ func (c *Client) addNonce(h http.Header) { c.nonces[v] = struct{}{} } -func (c *Client) httpClient() *http.Client { - if c.HTTPClient != nil { - return c.HTTPClient - } - return http.DefaultClient -} - -func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, urlStr string) (*http.Response, error) { - req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", urlStr, nil) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return c.do(ctx, req) -} - -func (c *Client) head(ctx context.Context, urlStr string) (*http.Response, error) { - req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", urlStr, nil) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - return c.do(ctx, req) -} - -func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, urlStr, contentType string, body io.Reader) (*http.Response, error) { - req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", urlStr, body) - if err != nil { - return nil, err - } - req.Header.Set("Content-Type", contentType) - return c.do(ctx, req) -} - -func (c *Client) do(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { - res, err := c.httpClient().Do(req.WithContext(ctx)) +func (c *Client) fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) { + r, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", url, nil) if err != nil { - select { - case <-ctx.Done(): - // Prefer the unadorned context error. - // (The acme package had tests assuming this, previously from ctxhttp's - // behavior, predating net/http supporting contexts natively) - // TODO(bradfitz): reconsider this in the future. But for now this - // requires no test updates. - return nil, ctx.Err() - default: - return nil, err - } + return "", err } - return res, nil -} - -func (c *Client) fetchNonce(ctx context.Context, url string) (string, error) { - resp, err := c.head(ctx, url) + resp, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, r) if err != nil { return "", err } @@ -852,24 +789,6 @@ func (c *Client) responseCert(ctx context.Context, res *http.Response, bundle bo return cert, nil } -// responseError creates an error of Error type from resp. -func responseError(resp *http.Response) error { - // don't care if ReadAll returns an error: - // json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway - b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body) - e := &wireError{Status: resp.StatusCode} - if err := json.Unmarshal(b, e); err != nil { - // this is not a regular error response: - // populate detail with anything we received, - // e.Status will already contain HTTP response code value - e.Detail = string(b) - if e.Detail == "" { - e.Detail = resp.Status - } - } - return e.error(resp.Header) -} - // chainCert fetches CA certificate chain recursively by following "up" links. // Each recursive call increments the depth by 1, resulting in an error // if the recursion level reaches maxChainLen. @@ -880,14 +799,11 @@ func (c *Client) chainCert(ctx context.Context, url string, depth int) ([][]byte return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too deep") } - res, err := c.get(ctx, url) + res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return nil, err } defer res.Body.Close() - if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK { - return nil, responseError(res) - } b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, maxCertSize+1)) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -932,65 +848,6 @@ func linkHeader(h http.Header, rel string) []string { return links } -// sleeper returns a function that accepts the Retry-After HTTP header value -// and an increment that's used with backoff to increasingly sleep on -// consecutive calls until the context is done. If the Retry-After header -// cannot be parsed, then backoff is used with a maximum sleep time of 10 -// seconds. -func sleeper(ctx context.Context) func(ra string, inc int) error { - var count int - return func(ra string, inc int) error { - count += inc - d := backoff(count, 10*time.Second) - d = retryAfter(ra, d) - wakeup := time.NewTimer(d) - defer wakeup.Stop() - select { - case <-ctx.Done(): - return ctx.Err() - case <-wakeup.C: - return nil - } - } -} - -// retryAfter parses a Retry-After HTTP header value, -// trying to convert v into an int (seconds) or use http.ParseTime otherwise. -// It returns d if v cannot be parsed. -func retryAfter(v string, d time.Duration) time.Duration { - if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil { - return time.Duration(i) * time.Second - } - t, err := http.ParseTime(v) - if err != nil { - return d - } - return t.Sub(timeNow()) -} - -// backoff computes a duration after which an n+1 retry iteration should occur -// using truncated exponential backoff algorithm. -// -// The n argument is always bounded between 0 and 30. -// The max argument defines upper bound for the returned value. -func backoff(n int, max time.Duration) time.Duration { - if n < 0 { - n = 0 - } - if n > 30 { - n = 30 - } - var d time.Duration - if x, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000)); err == nil { - d = time.Duration(x.Int64()) * time.Millisecond - } - d += time.Duration(1<<uint(n)) * time.Second - if d > max { - return max - } - return d -} - // keyAuth generates a key authorization string for a given token. func keyAuth(pub crypto.PublicKey, token string) (string, error) { th, err := JWKThumbprint(pub) @@ -1000,15 +857,25 @@ func keyAuth(pub crypto.PublicKey, token string) (string, error) { return fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", token, th), nil } +// defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate is a template used to create challenge certs for TLS challenges. +func defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate() *x509.Certificate { + return &x509.Certificate{ + SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), + NotBefore: time.Now(), + NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour), + BasicConstraintsValid: true, + KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, + ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, + } +} + // tlsChallengeCert creates a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges // with the given SANs and auto-generated public/private key pair. // The Subject Common Name is set to the first SAN to aid debugging. // To create a cert with a custom key pair, specify WithKey option. func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) { - var ( - key crypto.Signer - tmpl *x509.Certificate - ) + var key crypto.Signer + tmpl := defaultTLSChallengeCertTemplate() for _, o := range opt { switch o := o.(type) { case *certOptKey: @@ -1017,7 +884,7 @@ func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) { } key = o.key case *certOptTemplate: - var t = *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok + t := *(*x509.Certificate)(o) // shallow copy is ok tmpl = &t default: // package's fault, if we let this happen: @@ -1030,16 +897,6 @@ func tlsChallengeCert(san []string, opt []CertOption) (tls.Certificate, error) { return tls.Certificate{}, err } } - if tmpl == nil { - tmpl = &x509.Certificate{ - SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), - NotBefore: time.Now(), - NotAfter: time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour), - BasicConstraintsValid: true, - KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment | x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature, - ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}, - } - } tmpl.DNSNames = san if len(san) > 0 { tmpl.Subject.CommonName = san[0] diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go index 263b2913..a50d9bfc 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand func init() { - src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano()) + src := mathrand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano()) pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)} } @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy { } return func(_ context.Context, host string) error { if !whitelist[host] { - return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured") + return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: host %q not configured in HostWhitelist", host) } return nil } @@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error { } // Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client. -// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-sni-01", -// "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them -// to a TLS server via tls.Config. +// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-alpn-01", +// "tls-sni-01", "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, +// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config. // // You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache, // to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts. @@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ type Manager struct { // To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS. Prompt func(tosURL string) bool - // Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates. - // If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager. + // Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates + // and other state. If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of + // the Manager. Multiple Managers can share the same Cache. // - // Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public - // parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first. + // Using a persistent Cache, such as DirCache, is strongly recommended. Cache Cache // HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt @@ -127,8 +127,10 @@ type Manager struct { // Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration // and requesting new certificates. + // // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL - // directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key. + // as directory endpoint. If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is + // generated and, if Cache is not nil, stored in cache. // // Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect. Client *acme.Client @@ -140,22 +142,30 @@ type Manager struct { // If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used. Email string - // ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys. + // ForceRSA used to make the Manager generate RSA certificates. It is now ignored. // - // If false, a default is used. Currently the default - // is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve. + // Deprecated: the Manager will request the correct type of certificate based + // on what each client supports. ForceRSA bool + // ExtraExtensions are used when generating a new CSR (Certificate Request), + // thus allowing customization of the resulting certificate. + // For instance, TLS Feature Extension (RFC 7633) can be used + // to prevent an OCSP downgrade attack. + // + // The field value is passed to crypto/x509.CreateCertificateRequest + // in the template's ExtraExtensions field as is. + ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension + clientMu sync.Mutex client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method stateMu sync.Mutex - state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name + state map[certKey]*certState // renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers. - // It is keyed by domain name. renewalMu sync.Mutex - renewal map[string]*domainRenewal + renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal // tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens. tokensMu sync.RWMutex @@ -167,21 +177,60 @@ type Manager struct { // to be provisioned. // The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow. httpTokens map[string][]byte - // certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni challenges + // certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni and tls-alpn challenges // and is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name of ClientHello. - // Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix. + // Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix for tls-sni. Otherwise, they are domain names + // for tls-alpn. // The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow. certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate + // nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for + // testing purposes. + nowFunc func() time.Time +} + +// certKey is the key by which certificates are tracked in state, renewal and cache. +type certKey struct { + domain string // without trailing dot + isRSA bool // RSA cert for legacy clients (as opposed to default ECDSA) + isToken bool // tls-based challenge token cert; key type is undefined regardless of isRSA +} + +func (c certKey) String() string { + if c.isToken { + return c.domain + "+token" + } + if c.isRSA { + return c.domain + "+rsa" + } + return c.domain +} + +// TLSConfig creates a new TLS config suitable for net/http.Server servers, +// supporting HTTP/2 and the tls-alpn-01 ACME challenge type. +func (m *Manager) TLSConfig() *tls.Config { + return &tls.Config{ + GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate, + NextProtos: []string{ + "h2", "http/1.1", // enable HTTP/2 + acme.ALPNProto, // enable tls-alpn ACME challenges + }, + } } // GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook. // It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering -// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored. +// tls-alpn-01 and *.acme.invalid (tls-sni-01 and tls-sni-02) challenges. +// All other fields of hello are ignored. // // If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting // a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation. // The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible. // This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details. +// +// If GetCertificate is used directly, instead of via Manager.TLSConfig, package users will +// also have to add acme.ALPNProto to NextProtos for tls-alpn-01, or use HTTPHandler +// for http-01. (The tls-sni-* challenges have been deprecated by popular ACME providers +// due to security issues in the ecosystem.) func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) { if m.Prompt == nil { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set") @@ -194,7 +243,7 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid") } - if strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) { + if strings.ContainsAny(name, `+/\`) { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character") } @@ -203,14 +252,17 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute) defer cancel() - // check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge - if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") { + // Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI or TLS-ALPN challenge. + if wantsTokenCert(hello) { m.tokensMu.RLock() defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock() + // It's ok to use the same token cert key for both tls-sni and tls-alpn + // because there's always at most 1 token cert per on-going domain authorization. + // See m.verify for details. if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil { return cert, nil } - if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name); err == nil { + if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}); err == nil { return cert, nil } // TODO: cache error results? @@ -218,8 +270,11 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, } // regular domain - name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114 - cert, err := m.cert(ctx, name) + ck := certKey{ + domain: strings.TrimSuffix(name, "."), // golang.org/issue/18114 + isRSA: !supportsECDSA(hello), + } + cert, err := m.cert(ctx, ck) if err == nil { return cert, nil } @@ -231,14 +286,71 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil { return nil, err } - cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name) + cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, ck) if err != nil { return nil, err } - m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert) + m.cachePut(ctx, ck, cert) return cert, nil } +// wantsTokenCert reports whether a TLS request with SNI is made by a CA server +// for a challenge verification. +func wantsTokenCert(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { + // tls-alpn-01 + if len(hello.SupportedProtos) == 1 && hello.SupportedProtos[0] == acme.ALPNProto { + return true + } + // tls-sni-xx + return strings.HasSuffix(hello.ServerName, ".acme.invalid") +} + +func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { + // The "signature_algorithms" extension, if present, limits the key exchange + // algorithms allowed by the cipher suites. See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1. + if hello.SignatureSchemes != nil { + ecdsaOK := false + schemeLoop: + for _, scheme := range hello.SignatureSchemes { + const tlsECDSAWithSHA1 tls.SignatureScheme = 0x0203 // constant added in Go 1.10 + switch scheme { + case tlsECDSAWithSHA1, tls.ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256, + tls.ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, tls.ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512: + ecdsaOK = true + break schemeLoop + } + } + if !ecdsaOK { + return false + } + } + if hello.SupportedCurves != nil { + ecdsaOK := false + for _, curve := range hello.SupportedCurves { + if curve == tls.CurveP256 { + ecdsaOK = true + break + } + } + if !ecdsaOK { + return false + } + } + for _, suite := range hello.CipherSuites { + switch suite { + case tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305: + return true + } + } + return false +} + // HTTPHandler configures the Manager to provision ACME "http-01" challenge responses. // It returns an http.Handler that responds to the challenges and must be // running on port 80. If it receives a request that is not an ACME challenge, @@ -252,8 +364,8 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, // Because the fallback handler is run with unencrypted port 80 requests, // the fallback should not serve TLS-only requests. // -// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use TLS SNI -// challenges for domain verification. +// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01" +// challenge for domain verification. func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler { m.tokensMu.Lock() defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() @@ -304,16 +416,16 @@ func stripPort(hostport string) string { // cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache. // If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled // with the cached value. -func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { +func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) { m.stateMu.Lock() - if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok { + if s, ok := m.state[ck]; ok { m.stateMu.Unlock() s.RLock() defer s.RUnlock() return s.tlscert() } defer m.stateMu.Unlock() - cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name) + cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, ck) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -322,25 +434,25 @@ func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, erro return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign") } if m.state == nil { - m.state = make(map[string]*certState) + m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState) } s := &certState{ key: signer, cert: cert.Certificate, leaf: cert.Leaf, } - m.state[name] = s - go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter) + m.state[ck] = s + go m.renew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter) return cert, nil } // cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise. -// If a cached certficate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned. -func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { +// If a cached certificate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned. +func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) { if m.Cache == nil { return nil, ErrCacheMiss } - data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain) + data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, ck.String()) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -371,7 +483,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate } // verify and create TLS cert - leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey) + leaf, err := validCert(ck, pubDER, privKey, m.now()) if err != nil { return nil, ErrCacheMiss } @@ -383,7 +495,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate return tlscert, nil } -func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error { +func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, ck certKey, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error { if m.Cache == nil { return nil } @@ -415,7 +527,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Cert } } - return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes()) + return m.Cache.Put(ctx, ck.String(), buf.Bytes()) } func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error { @@ -432,9 +544,9 @@ func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error { // // If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete. // Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process. -func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) { +func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) { // TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once - state, err := m.certState(domain) + state, err := m.certState(ck) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -452,44 +564,44 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certifica defer state.Unlock() state.locked = false - der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain) + der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, ck) if err != nil { // Remove the failed state after some time, // making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello. time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() { - defer testDidRemoveState(domain) + defer testDidRemoveState(ck) m.stateMu.Lock() defer m.stateMu.Unlock() // Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid // before deleting. - s, ok := m.state[domain] + s, ok := m.state[ck] if !ok { return } - if _, err := validCert(domain, s.cert, s.key); err == nil { + if _, err := validCert(ck, s.cert, s.key, m.now()); err == nil { return } - delete(m.state, domain) + delete(m.state, ck) }) return nil, err } state.cert = der state.leaf = leaf - go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter) + go m.renew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter) return state.tlscert() } // certState returns a new or existing certState. // If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked. // The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created. -func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) { +func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) { m.stateMu.Lock() defer m.stateMu.Unlock() if m.state == nil { - m.state = make(map[string]*certState) + m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState) } // existing state - if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok { + if state, ok := m.state[ck]; ok { return state, nil } @@ -498,7 +610,7 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) { err error key crypto.Signer ) - if m.ForceRSA { + if ck.isRSA { key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) } else { key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) @@ -512,22 +624,22 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) { locked: true, } state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller - m.state[domain] = state + m.state[ck] = state return state, nil } // authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success. // The key argument is the certificate private key. -func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { +func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - if err := m.verify(ctx, client, domain); err != nil { + if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - csr, err := certRequest(key, domain) + csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } @@ -535,25 +647,55 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key) + leaf, err = validCert(ck, der, key, m.now()) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } return der, leaf, nil } +// revokePendingAuthz revokes all authorizations idenfied by the elements of uri slice. +// It ignores revocation errors. +func (m *Manager) revokePendingAuthz(ctx context.Context, uri []string) { + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) + if err != nil { + return + } + for _, u := range uri { + client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u) + } +} + // verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow // using each applicable ACME challenge type. func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error { // The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill // in this specific order. - challengeTypes := []string{"tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"} + challengeTypes := []string{"tls-alpn-01", "tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"} m.tokensMu.RLock() if m.tryHTTP01 { challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01") } m.tokensMu.RUnlock() + // Keep track of pending authzs and revoke the ones that did not validate. + pendingAuthzs := make(map[string]bool) + defer func() { + var uri []string + for k, pending := range pendingAuthzs { + if pending { + uri = append(uri, k) + } + } + if len(uri) > 0 { + // Use "detached" background context. + // The revocations need not happen in the current verification flow. + go m.revokePendingAuthz(context.Background(), uri) + } + }() + + // errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail + errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error) var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try for { // Start domain authorization and get the challenge. @@ -570,6 +712,8 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI) } + pendingAuthzs[authz.URI] = true + // Pick the next preferred challenge. var chal *acme.Challenge for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { @@ -577,28 +721,44 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string nextTyp++ } if chal == nil { - return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q; tried %q", domain, challengeTypes) + errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q", domain) + for chal, err := range errs { + errorMsg += fmt.Sprintf("; challenge %q failed with error: %v", chal.Type, err) + } + return errors.New(errorMsg) } - cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal) + cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain) if err != nil { + errs[chal] = err continue } defer cleanup() if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil { + errs[chal] = err continue } // A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate. - if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err == nil { - return nil + if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err != nil { + errs[chal] = err + continue } + delete(pendingAuthzs, authz.URI) + return nil } } // fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal. // The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded. -func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge) (cleanup func(), err error) { +func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) { switch chal.Type { + case "tls-alpn-01": + cert, err := client.TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(chal.Token, domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + m.putCertToken(ctx, domain, &cert) + return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(domain) }, nil case "tls-sni-01": cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token) if err != nil { @@ -634,8 +794,8 @@ func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge { return nil } -// putCertToken stores the cert under the named key in both m.certTokens map -// and m.Cache. +// putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name +// in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) { m.tokensMu.Lock() defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() @@ -643,17 +803,18 @@ func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certi m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate) } m.certTokens[name] = cert - m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert) + m.cachePut(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}, cert) } -// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate for the specified domain name +// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name // from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) { m.tokensMu.Lock() defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() delete(m.certTokens, name) if m.Cache != nil { - m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name) + ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true} + m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), ck.String()) } } @@ -704,7 +865,7 @@ func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) { // httpTokenCacheKey returns a key at which an http-01 token value may be stored // in the Manager's optional Cache. func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string { - return "http-01-" + path.Base(tokenPath) + return path.Base(tokenPath) + "+http-01" } // renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain. @@ -715,18 +876,18 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string { // // The key argument is a certificate private key. // The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter). -func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) { +func (m *Manager) renew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) { m.renewalMu.Lock() defer m.renewalMu.Unlock() - if m.renewal[domain] != nil { + if m.renewal[ck] != nil { // another goroutine is already on it return } if m.renewal == nil { - m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal) + m.renewal = make(map[certKey]*domainRenewal) } - dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key} - m.renewal[domain] = dr + dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, ck: ck, key: key} + m.renewal[ck] = dr dr.start(exp) } @@ -742,7 +903,10 @@ func (m *Manager) stopRenew() { } func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) { - const keyName = "acme_account.key" + const keyName = "acme_account+key" + + // Previous versions of autocert stored the value under a different key. + const legacyKeyName = "acme_account.key" genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) { return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) @@ -754,6 +918,9 @@ func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) { data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName) if err == ErrCacheMiss { + data, err = m.Cache.Get(ctx, legacyKeyName) + } + if err == ErrCacheMiss { key, err := genKey() if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -824,6 +991,13 @@ func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration { return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days } +func (m *Manager) now() time.Time { + if m.nowFunc != nil { + return m.nowFunc() + } + return time.Now() +} + // certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading. type certState struct { sync.RWMutex @@ -849,12 +1023,12 @@ func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) { }, nil } -// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn -// and optional SANs. -func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) { +// certRequest generates a CSR for the given common name cn and optional SANs. +func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, ext []pkix.Extension, san ...string) ([]byte, error) { req := &x509.CertificateRequest{ - Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn}, - DNSNames: san, + Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn}, + DNSNames: san, + ExtraExtensions: ext, } return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key) } @@ -885,12 +1059,12 @@ func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key") } -// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0], -// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates. -// It doesn't do any revocation checking. +// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf and der[0] +// correspond to the private key, the domain and key type match, and expiration dates +// are valid. It doesn't do any revocation checking. // // The returned value is the verified leaf cert. -func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { +func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { // parse public part(s) var n int for _, b := range der { @@ -902,22 +1076,21 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi n += copy(pub[n:], b) } x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub) - if len(x509Cert) == 0 { + if err != nil || len(x509Cert) == 0 { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found") } // verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name leaf = x509Cert[0] - now := timeNow() if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet") } if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate") } - if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil { + if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(ck.domain); err != nil { return nil, err } - // ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key + // ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key and matches the certKey type switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) { case *rsa.PublicKey: prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey) @@ -927,6 +1100,9 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key") } + if !ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value") + } case *ecdsa.PublicKey: prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) if !ok { @@ -935,6 +1111,9 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 { return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key") } + if ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken { + return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value") + } default: return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm") } @@ -955,8 +1134,6 @@ func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 { // For easier testing. var ( - timeNow = time.Now - // Called when a state is removed. - testDidRemoveState = func(domain string) {} + testDidRemoveState = func(certKey) {} ) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go index 61a5fd23..aa9aa845 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go @@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ import ( var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss") // Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates -// as opaque data. +// and other account data as opaque blobs. // -// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN. -// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern. +// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern. Keys can +// include any printable ASCII characters, except the following: \/:*?"<>| type Cache interface { // Get returns a certificate data for the specified key. // If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/listener.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/listener.go index d744df0e..1e069818 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/listener.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/listener.go @@ -72,11 +72,8 @@ func NewListener(domains ...string) net.Listener { // the Manager m's Prompt, Cache, HostPolicy, and other desired options. func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener { ln := &listener{ - m: m, - conf: &tls.Config{ - GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate, // bonus: panic on nil m - NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}, // Enable HTTP/2 - }, + m: m, + conf: m.TLSConfig(), } ln.tcpListener, ln.tcpListenErr = net.Listen("tcp", ":443") return ln diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go index 6c5da2bc..665f870d 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go @@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ const renewJitter = time.Hour // domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers // renewing a single domain's cert. type domainRenewal struct { - m *Manager - domain string - key crypto.Signer + m *Manager + ck certKey + key crypto.Signer timerMu sync.Mutex timer *time.Timer @@ -71,25 +71,43 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) renew() { testDidRenewLoop(next, err) } +// updateState locks and replaces the relevant Manager.state item with the given +// state. It additionally updates dr.key with the given state's key. +func (dr *domainRenewal) updateState(state *certState) { + dr.m.stateMu.Lock() + defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock() + dr.key = state.key + dr.m.state[dr.ck] = state +} + // do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item. // Instead, it requests a new certificate independently and, upon success, // replaces dr.m.state item with a new one and updates cache for the given domain. // -// It may return immediately if the expiration date of the currently cached cert -// is far enough in the future. +// It may lock and update the Manager.state if the expiration date of the currently +// cached cert is far enough in the future. // // The returned value is a time interval after which the renewal should occur again. func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) { // a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment // but we try nonetheless - if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.domain); err == nil { + if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.ck); err == nil { next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter) if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+renewJitter { - return next, nil + signer, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer) + if ok { + state := &certState{ + key: signer, + cert: tlscert.Certificate, + leaf: tlscert.Leaf, + } + dr.updateState(state) + return next, nil + } } } - der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain) + der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.ck) if err != nil { return 0, err } @@ -102,16 +120,15 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) { if err != nil { return 0, err } - dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.domain, tlscert) - dr.m.stateMu.Lock() - defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock() - // m.state is guaranteed to be non-nil at this point - dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state + if err := dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.ck, tlscert); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + dr.updateState(state) return dr.next(leaf.NotAfter), nil } func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration { - d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore() + d := expiry.Sub(dr.m.now()) - dr.m.renewBefore() // add a bit of randomness to renew deadline n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(renewJitter)) d -= time.Duration(n) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a43ce6a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package acme + +import ( + "bytes" + "context" + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/json" + "fmt" + "io/ioutil" + "math/big" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" +) + +// retryTimer encapsulates common logic for retrying unsuccessful requests. +// It is not safe for concurrent use. +type retryTimer struct { + // backoffFn provides backoff delay sequence for retries. + // See Client.RetryBackoff doc comment. + backoffFn func(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration + // n is the current retry attempt. + n int +} + +func (t *retryTimer) inc() { + t.n++ +} + +// backoff pauses the current goroutine as described in Client.RetryBackoff. +func (t *retryTimer) backoff(ctx context.Context, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) error { + d := t.backoffFn(t.n, r, res) + if d <= 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("acme: no more retries for %s; tried %d time(s)", r.URL, t.n) + } + wakeup := time.NewTimer(d) + defer wakeup.Stop() + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + return ctx.Err() + case <-wakeup.C: + return nil + } +} + +func (c *Client) retryTimer() *retryTimer { + f := c.RetryBackoff + if f == nil { + f = defaultBackoff + } + return &retryTimer{backoffFn: f} +} + +// defaultBackoff provides default Client.RetryBackoff implementation +// using a truncated exponential backoff algorithm, +// as described in Client.RetryBackoff. +// +// The n argument is always bounded between 1 and 30. +// The returned value is always greater than 0. +func defaultBackoff(n int, r *http.Request, res *http.Response) time.Duration { + const max = 10 * time.Second + var jitter time.Duration + if x, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(1000)); err == nil { + // Set the minimum to 1ms to avoid a case where + // an invalid Retry-After value is parsed into 0 below, + // resulting in the 0 returned value which would unintentionally + // stop the retries. + jitter = (1 + time.Duration(x.Int64())) * time.Millisecond + } + if v, ok := res.Header["Retry-After"]; ok { + return retryAfter(v[0]) + jitter + } + + if n < 1 { + n = 1 + } + if n > 30 { + n = 30 + } + d := time.Duration(1<<uint(n-1))*time.Second + jitter + if d > max { + return max + } + return d +} + +// retryAfter parses a Retry-After HTTP header value, +// trying to convert v into an int (seconds) or use http.ParseTime otherwise. +// It returns zero value if v cannot be parsed. +func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration { + if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil { + return time.Duration(i) * time.Second + } + t, err := http.ParseTime(v) + if err != nil { + return 0 + } + return t.Sub(timeNow()) +} + +// resOkay is a function that reports whether the provided response is okay. +// It is expected to keep the response body unread. +type resOkay func(*http.Response) bool + +// wantStatus returns a function which reports whether the code +// matches the status code of a response. +func wantStatus(codes ...int) resOkay { + return func(res *http.Response) bool { + for _, code := range codes { + if code == res.StatusCode { + return true + } + } + return false + } +} + +// get issues an unsigned GET request to the specified URL. +// It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true. +// +// get retries unsuccessful attempts according to c.RetryBackoff +// until the context is done or a non-retriable error is received. +func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) { + retry := c.retryTimer() + for { + req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", url, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + res, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, req) + switch { + case err != nil: + return nil, err + case ok(res): + return res, nil + case isRetriable(res.StatusCode): + retry.inc() + resErr := responseError(res) + res.Body.Close() + // Ignore the error value from retry.backoff + // and return the one from last retry, as received from the CA. + if retry.backoff(ctx, req, res) != nil { + return nil, resErr + } + default: + defer res.Body.Close() + return nil, responseError(res) + } + } +} + +// post issues a signed POST request in JWS format using the provided key +// to the specified URL. +// It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true. +// +// post retries unsuccessful attempts according to c.RetryBackoff +// until the context is done or a non-retriable error is received. +// It uses postNoRetry to make individual requests. +func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) { + retry := c.retryTimer() + for { + res, req, err := c.postNoRetry(ctx, key, url, body) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if ok(res) { + return res, nil + } + resErr := responseError(res) + res.Body.Close() + switch { + // Check for bad nonce before isRetriable because it may have been returned + // with an unretriable response code such as 400 Bad Request. + case isBadNonce(resErr): + // Consider any previously stored nonce values to be invalid. + c.clearNonces() + case !isRetriable(res.StatusCode): + return nil, resErr + } + retry.inc() + // Ignore the error value from retry.backoff + // and return the one from last retry, as received from the CA. + if err := retry.backoff(ctx, req, res); err != nil { + return nil, resErr + } + } +} + +// postNoRetry signs the body with the given key and POSTs it to the provided url. +// The body argument must be JSON-serializable. +// It is used by c.post to retry unsuccessful attempts. +func (c *Client) postNoRetry(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body interface{}) (*http.Response, *http.Request, error) { + nonce, err := c.popNonce(ctx, url) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + b, err := jwsEncodeJSON(body, key, nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", url, bytes.NewReader(b)) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/jose+json") + res, err := c.doNoRetry(ctx, req) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + c.addNonce(res.Header) + return res, req, nil +} + +// doNoRetry issues a request req, replacing its context (if any) with ctx. +func (c *Client) doNoRetry(ctx context.Context, req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) { + res, err := c.httpClient().Do(req.WithContext(ctx)) + if err != nil { + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + // Prefer the unadorned context error. + // (The acme package had tests assuming this, previously from ctxhttp's + // behavior, predating net/http supporting contexts natively) + // TODO(bradfitz): reconsider this in the future. But for now this + // requires no test updates. + return nil, ctx.Err() + default: + return nil, err + } + } + return res, nil +} + +func (c *Client) httpClient() *http.Client { + if c.HTTPClient != nil { + return c.HTTPClient + } + return http.DefaultClient +} + +// isBadNonce reports whether err is an ACME "badnonce" error. +func isBadNonce(err error) bool { + // According to the spec badNonce is urn:ietf:params:acme:error:badNonce. + // However, ACME servers in the wild return their versions of the error. + // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02#section-5.4 + // and https://github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/blob/0e07eacb/docs/acme-divergences.md#section-66. + ae, ok := err.(*Error) + return ok && strings.HasSuffix(strings.ToLower(ae.ProblemType), ":badnonce") +} + +// isRetriable reports whether a request can be retried +// based on the response status code. +// +// Note that a "bad nonce" error is returned with a non-retriable 400 Bad Request code. +// Callers should parse the response and check with isBadNonce. +func isRetriable(code int) bool { + return code <= 399 || code >= 500 || code == http.StatusTooManyRequests +} + +// responseError creates an error of Error type from resp. +func responseError(resp *http.Response) error { + // don't care if ReadAll returns an error: + // json.Unmarshal will fail in that case anyway + b, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(resp.Body) + e := &wireError{Status: resp.StatusCode} + if err := json.Unmarshal(b, e); err != nil { + // this is not a regular error response: + // populate detail with anything we received, + // e.Status will already contain HTTP response code value + e.Detail = string(b) + if e.Detail == "" { + e.Detail = resp.Status + } + } + return e.error(resp.Header) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go index 3e199749..54792c06 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) { if e.Header == nil { return 0, true } - return retryAfter(e.Header.Get("Retry-After"), 0), true + return retryAfter(e.Header.Get("Retry-After")), true } // Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key. @@ -296,8 +296,8 @@ func (e *wireError) error(h http.Header) *Error { } } -// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods for -// customizing a temporary certificate for TLS-SNI challenges. +// CertOption is an optional argument type for the TLS ChallengeCert methods for +// customizing a temporary certificate for TLS-based challenges. type CertOption interface { privateCertOpt() } @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ func (*certOptKey) privateCertOpt() {} // WithTemplate creates an option for specifying a certificate template. // See x509.CreateCertificate for template usage details. // -// In TLSSNIxChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent, +// In TLS ChallengeCert methods, the template is also used as parent, // resulting in a self-signed certificate. // The DNSNames field of t is always overwritten for tls-sni challenge certs. func WithTemplate(t *x509.Certificate) CertOption { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go index 4f26b49b..d6f683ba 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go @@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ // https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/. // // These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in -// RFC 8032. +// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key +// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing +// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC +// 8032 private key as the “seed”. package ed25519 // This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519 @@ -31,6 +34,8 @@ const ( PrivateKeySize = 64 // SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package. SignatureSize = 64 + // SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032. + SeedSize = 32 ) // PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys. @@ -46,6 +51,15 @@ func (priv PrivateKey) Public() crypto.PublicKey { return PublicKey(publicKey) } +// Seed returns the private key seed corresponding to priv. It is provided for +// interoperability with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds +// in this package. +func (priv PrivateKey) Seed() []byte { + seed := make([]byte, SeedSize) + copy(seed, priv[:32]) + return seed +} + // Sign signs the given message with priv. // Ed25519 performs two passes over messages to be signed and therefore cannot // handle pre-hashed messages. Thus opts.HashFunc() must return zero to @@ -61,19 +75,33 @@ func (priv PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, message []byte, opts crypto.SignerOp // GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand. // If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used. -func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (publicKey PublicKey, privateKey PrivateKey, err error) { +func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) { if rand == nil { rand = cryptorand.Reader } - privateKey = make([]byte, PrivateKeySize) - publicKey = make([]byte, PublicKeySize) - _, err = io.ReadFull(rand, privateKey[:32]) - if err != nil { + seed := make([]byte, SeedSize) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, seed); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - digest := sha512.Sum512(privateKey[:32]) + privateKey := NewKeyFromSeed(seed) + publicKey := make([]byte, PublicKeySize) + copy(publicKey, privateKey[32:]) + + return publicKey, privateKey, nil +} + +// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if +// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability +// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this +// package. +func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey { + if l := len(seed); l != SeedSize { + panic("ed25519: bad seed length: " + strconv.Itoa(l)) + } + + digest := sha512.Sum512(seed) digest[0] &= 248 digest[31] &= 127 digest[31] |= 64 @@ -85,10 +113,11 @@ func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (publicKey PublicKey, privateKey PrivateKey, er var publicKeyBytes [32]byte A.ToBytes(&publicKeyBytes) + privateKey := make([]byte, PrivateKeySize) + copy(privateKey, seed) copy(privateKey[32:], publicKeyBytes[:]) - copy(publicKey, publicKeyBytes[:]) - return publicKey, privateKey, nil + return privateKey } // Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will @@ -171,9 +200,16 @@ func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool { edwards25519.ScReduce(&hReduced, &digest) var R edwards25519.ProjectiveGroupElement - var b [32]byte - copy(b[:], sig[32:]) - edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &b) + var s [32]byte + copy(s[:], sig[32:]) + + // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-5.1.7 requires that s be in + // the range [0, order) in order to prevent signature malleability. + if !edwards25519.ScMinimal(&s) { + return false + } + + edwards25519.GeDoubleScalarMultVartime(&R, &hReduced, &A, &s) var checkR [32]byte R.ToBytes(&checkR) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/edwards25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/edwards25519.go index 5f8b9947..fd03c252 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/edwards25519.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/edwards25519.go @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ package edwards25519 +import "encoding/binary" + // This code is a port of the public domain, “ref10” implementation of ed25519 // from SUPERCOP. @@ -1769,3 +1771,23 @@ func ScReduce(out *[32]byte, s *[64]byte) { out[30] = byte(s11 >> 9) out[31] = byte(s11 >> 17) } + +// order is the order of Curve25519 in little-endian form. +var order = [4]uint64{0x5812631a5cf5d3ed, 0x14def9dea2f79cd6, 0, 0x1000000000000000} + +// ScMinimal returns true if the given scalar is less than the order of the +// curve. +func ScMinimal(scalar *[32]byte) bool { + for i := 3; ; i-- { + v := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(scalar[i*8:]) + if v > order[i] { + return false + } else if v < order[i] { + break + } else if i == 0 { + return false + } + } + + return true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go index 0f8efdba..6570847f 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -2,197 +2,263 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3. +// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified +// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3. package chacha20 -import "encoding/binary" - -const rounds = 20 - -// core applies the ChaCha20 core function to 16-byte input in, 32-byte key k, -// and 16-byte constant c, and puts the result into 64-byte array out. -func core(out *[64]byte, in *[16]byte, k *[32]byte) { - j0 := uint32(0x61707865) - j1 := uint32(0x3320646e) - j2 := uint32(0x79622d32) - j3 := uint32(0x6b206574) - j4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[0:4]) - j5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[4:8]) - j6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[8:12]) - j7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[12:16]) - j8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[16:20]) - j9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[20:24]) - j10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[24:28]) - j11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(k[28:32]) - j12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[0:4]) - j13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[4:8]) - j14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[8:12]) - j15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in[12:16]) - - x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 := j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7 - x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15 := j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15 - - for i := 0; i < rounds; i += 2 { - x0 += x4 - x12 ^= x0 - x12 = (x12 << 16) | (x12 >> (16)) - x8 += x12 - x4 ^= x8 - x4 = (x4 << 12) | (x4 >> (20)) - x0 += x4 - x12 ^= x0 - x12 = (x12 << 8) | (x12 >> (24)) - x8 += x12 - x4 ^= x8 - x4 = (x4 << 7) | (x4 >> (25)) - x1 += x5 - x13 ^= x1 - x13 = (x13 << 16) | (x13 >> 16) - x9 += x13 - x5 ^= x9 - x5 = (x5 << 12) | (x5 >> 20) - x1 += x5 - x13 ^= x1 - x13 = (x13 << 8) | (x13 >> 24) - x9 += x13 - x5 ^= x9 - x5 = (x5 << 7) | (x5 >> 25) - x2 += x6 - x14 ^= x2 - x14 = (x14 << 16) | (x14 >> 16) - x10 += x14 - x6 ^= x10 - x6 = (x6 << 12) | (x6 >> 20) - x2 += x6 - x14 ^= x2 - x14 = (x14 << 8) | (x14 >> 24) - x10 += x14 - x6 ^= x10 - x6 = (x6 << 7) | (x6 >> 25) - x3 += x7 - x15 ^= x3 - x15 = (x15 << 16) | (x15 >> 16) - x11 += x15 - x7 ^= x11 - x7 = (x7 << 12) | (x7 >> 20) - x3 += x7 - x15 ^= x3 - x15 = (x15 << 8) | (x15 >> 24) - x11 += x15 - x7 ^= x11 - x7 = (x7 << 7) | (x7 >> 25) - x0 += x5 - x15 ^= x0 - x15 = (x15 << 16) | (x15 >> 16) - x10 += x15 - x5 ^= x10 - x5 = (x5 << 12) | (x5 >> 20) - x0 += x5 - x15 ^= x0 - x15 = (x15 << 8) | (x15 >> 24) - x10 += x15 - x5 ^= x10 - x5 = (x5 << 7) | (x5 >> 25) - x1 += x6 - x12 ^= x1 - x12 = (x12 << 16) | (x12 >> 16) - x11 += x12 - x6 ^= x11 - x6 = (x6 << 12) | (x6 >> 20) - x1 += x6 - x12 ^= x1 - x12 = (x12 << 8) | (x12 >> 24) - x11 += x12 - x6 ^= x11 - x6 = (x6 << 7) | (x6 >> 25) - x2 += x7 - x13 ^= x2 - x13 = (x13 << 16) | (x13 >> 16) - x8 += x13 - x7 ^= x8 - x7 = (x7 << 12) | (x7 >> 20) - x2 += x7 - x13 ^= x2 - x13 = (x13 << 8) | (x13 >> 24) - x8 += x13 - x7 ^= x8 - x7 = (x7 << 7) | (x7 >> 25) - x3 += x4 - x14 ^= x3 - x14 = (x14 << 16) | (x14 >> 16) - x9 += x14 - x4 ^= x9 - x4 = (x4 << 12) | (x4 >> 20) - x3 += x4 - x14 ^= x3 - x14 = (x14 << 8) | (x14 >> 24) - x9 += x14 - x4 ^= x9 - x4 = (x4 << 7) | (x4 >> 25) +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" +) + +// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 // incremented after each block + nonce [3]uint32 + buf [bufSize]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes + len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf +} + +// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce. +// The initial counter value is set to 0. +func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher { + return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce} +} + +// ChaCha20 constants spelling "expand 32-byte k" +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 +) + +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20) + a += b + d ^= a + d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24) + c += d + b ^= c + b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // xor src with buffered keystream first + if s.len != 0 { + buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(buf) { + buf = buf[:len(src)] + } + td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint + for i, b := range buf { + td[i] = ts[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(buf) + if s.len != 0 { + return + } + s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer + src = src[len(buf):] + dst = dst[len(buf):] + } + + if len(src) == 0 { + return } + if haveAsm { + if uint64(len(src))+uint64(s.counter)*64 > (1<<38)-64 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } + s.xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src) + return + } + + // set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed + // (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills) + rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block + fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block + if rem > 0 { + copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:]) + } + + // pre-calculate most of the first round + s1, s5, s9, s13 := quarterRound(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0]) + s2, s6, s10, s14 := quarterRound(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1]) + s3, s7, s11, s15 := quarterRound(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2]) + + n := len(src) + src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint + for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 { + // calculate the remainder of the first round + s0, s4, s8, s12 := quarterRound(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter) - x0 += j0 - x1 += j1 - x2 += j2 - x3 += j3 - x4 += j4 - x5 += j5 - x6 += j6 - x7 += j7 - x8 += j8 - x9 += j9 - x10 += j10 - x11 += j11 - x12 += j12 - x13 += j13 - x14 += j14 - x15 += j15 - - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x4) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x5) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x6) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x7) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[32:36], x8) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[36:40], x9) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[40:44], x10) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[44:48], x11) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[48:52], x12) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[52:56], x13) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[56:60], x14) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[60:64], x15) + // execute the second round + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(s0, s5, s10, s15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s1, s6, s11, s12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s2, s7, s8, s13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s3, s4, s9, s14) + + // execute the remaining 18 rounds + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + x0 += j0 + x1 += j1 + x2 += j2 + x3 += j3 + + x4 += s.key[0] + x5 += s.key[1] + x6 += s.key[2] + x7 += s.key[3] + x8 += s.key[4] + x9 += s.key[5] + x10 += s.key[6] + x11 += s.key[7] + + x12 += s.counter + x13 += s.nonce[0] + x14 += s.nonce[1] + x15 += s.nonce[2] + + // increment the counter + s.counter += 1 + if s.counter == 0 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } + + // pad to 64 bytes if needed + in, out := src[i:], dst[i:] + if i == fin { + // src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before + // the main loop + in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:] + } + in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint + + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result + xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0) + xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1) + xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2) + xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3) + xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4) + xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5) + xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6) + xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7) + xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8) + xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9) + xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10) + xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11) + xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12) + xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13) + xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14) + xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15) + } + // copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst + if rem != 0 { + s.len = 64 - rem + copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]) + } +} + +// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block +// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key +// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and +// the counter will be unchanged. +func (s *Cipher) Advance() { + s.len -= s.len % 64 + if s.len == 0 { + s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} + } } // XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters. // In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw // ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce). func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) { - var block [64]byte - var counterCopy [16]byte - copy(counterCopy[:], counter[:]) - - for len(in) >= 64 { - core(&block, &counterCopy, key) - for i, x := range block { - out[i] = in[i] ^ x - } - u := uint32(1) - for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { - u += uint32(counterCopy[i]) - counterCopy[i] = byte(u) - u >>= 8 - } - in = in[64:] - out = out[64:] + s := Cipher{ + key: [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + }, + nonce: [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]), + }, + counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]), } + s.XORKeyStream(out, in) +} - if len(in) > 0 { - core(&block, &counterCopy, key) - for i, v := range in { - out[i] = v ^ block[i] - } +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a key and a +// nonce. It should only be used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key *[8]uint32, nonce *[4]uint32) [8]uint32 { + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4, x5, x6, x7 := key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3] + x8, x9, x10, x11 := key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7] + x12, x13, x14, x15 := nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3] + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) } + + var out [8]uint32 + out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3] = x0, x1, x2, x3 + out[4], out[5], out[6], out[7] = x12, x13, x14, x15 + return out } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..91520d1d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !s390x gccgo appengine + +package chacha20 + +const ( + bufSize = 64 + haveAsm = false +) + +func (*Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { + panic("not implemented") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0c1c671c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +var haveAsm = hasVectorFacility() + +const bufSize = 256 + +// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports the vector +// facility (vx). +// Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +func hasVectorFacility() bool + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. +// Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter, &c.buf, &c.len) +} + +// EXRL targets, DO NOT CALL! +func mvcSrcToBuf() +func mvcBufToDst() diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..98427c5e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,283 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "go_asm.h" +#include "textflag.h" + +// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as +// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute +// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed +// with the bytes in the input slice. + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32 +// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908 +DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c +// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3] +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 + +// EXRL targets: +TEXT ·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0 + MVC $1, (R1), (R8) + RET + +TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0 + MVC $1, (R8), (R9) + RET + +#define BSWAP V5 +#define J0 V6 +#define KEY0 V7 +#define KEY1 V8 +#define NONCE V9 +#define CTR V10 +#define M0 V11 +#define M1 V12 +#define M2 V13 +#define M3 V14 +#define INC V15 +#define X0 V16 +#define X1 V17 +#define X2 V18 +#define X3 V19 +#define X4 V20 +#define X5 V21 +#define X6 V22 +#define X7 V23 +#define X8 V24 +#define X9 V25 +#define X10 V26 +#define X11 V27 +#define X12 V28 +#define X13 V29 +#define X14 V30 +#define X15 V31 + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 20 + +#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $7, d1, d1 + +#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \ + VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \ + VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \ + VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3 + +#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VAF x, v0, v0 \ + VAF x, v1, v1 \ + VAF x, v2, v2 \ + VAF x, v3, v3 + +#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VLM off(src), M0, M3 \ + PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VX v0, M0, M0 \ + VX v1, M1, M1 \ + VX v2, M2, M2 \ + VX v3, M3, M3 \ + VSTM M0, M3, off(dst) + +#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \ + VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]} + VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]} + VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]} + VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]} + VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]} + VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]} + VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} + VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] + LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src) + MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter + MOVD buf+72(FP), R8 // R8=buf + MOVD len+80(FP), R9 // R9=len + + // load BSWAP and J0 + VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 + + // set up tail buffer + ADD $-1, R4, R12 + MOVBZ R12, R12 + CMPUBEQ R12, $255, aligned + MOVD R4, R1 + AND $~255, R1 + MOVD $(R3)(R1*1), R1 + EXRL $·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), R12 + MOVD $255, R0 + SUB R12, R0 + MOVD R0, (R9) // update len + +aligned: + // setup + MOVD $95, R0 + VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 + VLL R0, (R6), NONCE + VZERO M0 + VLEIB $7, $32, M0 + VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE + + // initialize counter values + VLREPF (R7), CTR + VZERO INC + VLEIF $1, $1, INC + VLEIF $2, $2, INC + VLEIF $3, $3, INC + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + VREPIF $4, INC + +chacha: + VREPF $0, J0, X0 + VREPF $1, J0, X1 + VREPF $2, J0, X2 + VREPF $3, J0, X3 + VREPF $0, KEY0, X4 + VREPF $1, KEY0, X5 + VREPF $2, KEY0, X6 + VREPF $3, KEY0, X7 + VREPF $0, KEY1, X8 + VREPF $1, KEY1, X9 + VREPF $2, KEY1, X10 + VREPF $3, KEY1, X11 + VLR CTR, X12 + VREPF $1, NONCE, X13 + VREPF $2, NONCE, X14 + VREPF $3, NONCE, X15 + + MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1 + +loop: + ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11) + ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9) + + ADD $-1, R1 + BNE loop + + // decrement length + ADD $-256, R4 + BLT tail + +continue: + // rearrange vectors + SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) + SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7) + SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11) + VAF CTR, X12, X12 + SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15) + + // increment counters + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + + // xor keystream with plaintext + XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12) + XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13) + XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14) + XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15) + + // increment pointers + MOVD $256(R2), R2 + MOVD $256(R3), R3 + + CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha + CMPUBEQ R12, $255, return + EXRL $·mvcBufToDst(SB), R12 // len was updated during setup + +return: + VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) + RET + +tail: + MOVD R2, R9 + MOVD R8, R2 + MOVD R8, R3 + MOVD $0, R4 + JMP continue + +// func hasVectorFacility() bool +TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1 + MOVD $x-24(SP), R1 + XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage + MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1 + WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1) + XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0 + MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1 + AND $0x40, R1 + BEQ novector + +vectorinstalled: + // check if the vector instruction has been enabled + VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16 + VLGVB $0, V16, R1 + CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector + MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx + RET + +novector: + MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9c5ba0b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found src the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20 + +import ( + "runtime" +) + +// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. +const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || + runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" + +// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and +// places the result in little endian byte order in dst. +func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) { + _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks + if unaligned { + // The compiler should optimize this code into + // 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores. + // TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably + // good job with the generic code below. + // See issue #25111 for more details. + v := uint32(src[0]) + v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8 + v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16 + v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24 + v ^= u + dst[0] = byte(v) + dst[1] = byte(v >> 8) + dst[2] = byte(v >> 16) + dst[3] = byte(v >> 24) + } else { + dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u) + dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8) + dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16) + dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f38797bf --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !appengine + +// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic +// code but require careful thought to use correctly. +package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" + +import "unsafe" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1])) +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..0cc4a8a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build appengine + +// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic +// code but require careful thought to use correctly. +package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" + +// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect +// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed. + +import "reflect" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() && + reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer() +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go index 53ee83cf..a98d1bd4 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox/secretbox.go @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ This package is interoperable with NaCl: https://nacl.cr.yp.to/secretbox.html. package secretbox // import "golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/secretbox" import ( + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" "golang.org/x/crypto/salsa20/salsa" ) @@ -87,6 +88,9 @@ func Seal(out, message []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) []byte { copy(poly1305Key[:], firstBlock[:]) ret, out := sliceForAppend(out, len(message)+poly1305.TagSize) + if subtle.AnyOverlap(out, message) { + panic("nacl: invalid buffer overlap") + } // We XOR up to 32 bytes of message with the keystream generated from // the first block. @@ -118,7 +122,7 @@ func Seal(out, message []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) []byte { // Open authenticates and decrypts a box produced by Seal and appends the // message to out, which must not overlap box. The output will be Overhead // bytes smaller than box. -func Open(out []byte, box []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) ([]byte, bool) { +func Open(out, box []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) ([]byte, bool) { if len(box) < Overhead { return nil, false } @@ -143,6 +147,9 @@ func Open(out []byte, box []byte, nonce *[24]byte, key *[32]byte) ([]byte, bool) } ret, out := sliceForAppend(out, len(box)-Overhead) + if subtle.AnyOverlap(out, box) { + panic("nacl: invalid buffer overlap") + } // We XOR up to 32 bytes of box with the keystream generated from // the first block. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..751eec52 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x gccgo appengine nacl + +package poly1305 + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + sumGeneric(out, msg, key) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go index b2805a5c..c4d59bd0 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go @@ -2,16 +2,14 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -// +build !amd64,!arm gccgo appengine nacl - package poly1305 import "encoding/binary" -// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { +// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and +// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of +// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available. +func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { var ( h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7a266cec --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +package poly1305 + +// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports +// the vector facility (vx). +func hasVectorFacility() bool + +// hasVMSLFacility reports whether the machine supports +// Vector Multiply Sum Logical (VMSL). +func hasVMSLFacility() bool + +var hasVX = hasVectorFacility() +var hasVMSL = hasVMSLFacility() + +// poly1305vx is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available. +//go:noescape +func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) + +// poly1305vmsl is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions, including VMSL. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available and if VMSL is supported. +//go:noescape +func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) + +// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + if hasVX { + var mPtr *byte + if len(m) > 0 { + mPtr = &m[0] + } + if hasVMSL && len(m) > 256 { + poly1305vmsl(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key) + } else { + poly1305vx(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key) + } + } else { + sumGeneric(out, m, key) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..356c07a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,400 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx). + +// constants +#define MOD26 V0 +#define EX0 V1 +#define EX1 V2 +#define EX2 V3 + +// temporaries +#define T_0 V4 +#define T_1 V5 +#define T_2 V6 +#define T_3 V7 +#define T_4 V8 + +// key (r) +#define R_0 V9 +#define R_1 V10 +#define R_2 V11 +#define R_3 V12 +#define R_4 V13 +#define R5_1 V14 +#define R5_2 V15 +#define R5_3 V16 +#define R5_4 V17 +#define RSAVE_0 R5 +#define RSAVE_1 R6 +#define RSAVE_2 R7 +#define RSAVE_3 R8 +#define RSAVE_4 R9 +#define R5SAVE_1 V28 +#define R5SAVE_2 V29 +#define R5SAVE_3 V30 +#define R5SAVE_4 V31 + +// message block +#define F_0 V18 +#define F_1 V19 +#define F_2 V20 +#define F_3 V21 +#define F_4 V22 + +// accumulator +#define H_0 V23 +#define H_1 V24 +#define H_2 V25 +#define H_3 V26 +#define H_4 V27 + +GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f +DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f + +GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $64 +// MOD26 +DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff +DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100 +DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706 +DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+48(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d +DATA ·constants<>+56(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d + +// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction] +#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \ + VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \ + VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \ + VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \ + VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \ + VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \ + VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \ + VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \ + VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \ + VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \ + VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \ + VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \ + VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \ + VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \ + VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \ + VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \ + VAG T_0, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_3, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_4, h4, h4 + +// carry h0->h1 h3->h4, h1->h2 h4->h0, h0->h1 h2->h3, h3->h4 +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_0, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_1, h4, h4 \ + VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \ + VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \ + VN MOD26, h1, h1 \ + VN MOD26, h4, h4 \ + VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \ + VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_4, h0, h0 \ + VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h2, h2 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_0, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_2, h4, h4 + +// expand in0 into d[0] and in1 into d[1] +#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \ + VGBM $0x0707, d1 \ // d1=tmp + VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \ + VN d1, d4, d4 \ + VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \ + VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d0, d0 \ + VN MOD26, d1, d1 \ + VN MOD26, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d3, d3 + +// pack h4:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry) +#define PACK(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESLG $26, h1, h1 \ + VESLG $26, h3, h3 \ + VO h0, h1, h0 \ + VO h2, h3, h2 \ + VESLG $4, h2, h2 \ + VLEIB $7, $48, h1 \ + VSLB h1, h2, h2 \ + VO h0, h2, h0 \ + VLEIB $7, $104, h1 \ + VSLB h1, h4, h3 \ + VO h3, h0, h0 \ + VLEIB $7, $24, h1 \ + VSRLB h1, h4, h1 + +// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 +#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \ + VZERO t0 \ + VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \ + VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \ + VAQ h0, t0, t0 \ + VONE t2 \ + VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \ + VONE t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VN h0, t1, t2 \ + VNC t0, t1, t1 \ + VO t1, t2, h0 + +// func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305vx(SB), $0-32 + // This code processes up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration + // using the algorithm described in: + // NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe + // https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf + LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key + + // load MOD26, EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), MOD26, EX2 + + // setup r + VL (R4), T_0 + MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6 + VL (R6), T_1 + VN T_0, T_1, T_0 + EXPAND(T_0, T_0, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4) + + // setup r*5 + VLEIG $0, $5, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $5, T_0 + + // store r (for final block) + VMLOF T_0, R_1, R5SAVE_1 + VMLOF T_0, R_2, R5SAVE_2 + VMLOF T_0, R_3, R5SAVE_3 + VMLOF T_0, R_4, R5SAVE_4 + VLGVG $0, R_0, RSAVE_0 + VLGVG $0, R_1, RSAVE_1 + VLGVG $0, R_2, RSAVE_2 + VLGVG $0, R_3, RSAVE_3 + VLGVG $0, R_4, RSAVE_4 + + // skip r**2 calculation + CMPBLE R3, $16, skip + + // calculate r**2 + MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5SAVE_1, R5SAVE_2, R5SAVE_3, R5SAVE_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + VLEIG $0, $5, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $5, T_0 + VMLOF T_0, H_1, R5_1 + VMLOF T_0, H_2, R5_2 + VMLOF T_0, H_3, R5_3 + VMLOF T_0, H_4, R5_4 + VLR H_0, R_0 + VLR H_1, R_1 + VLR H_2, R_2 + VLR H_3, R_3 + VLR H_4, R_4 + + // initialize h + VZERO H_0 + VZERO H_1 + VZERO H_2 + VZERO H_3 + VZERO H_4 + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 + VLM (R2), T_0, T_1 + SUB $32, R3 + MOVD $32(R2), R2 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + VLEIB $12, $1, F_4 + +multiply: + VAG H_0, F_0, F_0 + VAG H_1, F_1, F_1 + VAG H_2, F_2, F_2 + VAG H_3, F_3, F_3 + VAG H_4, F_4, F_4 + MULTIPLY(F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + +finish: + // sum vectors + VZERO T_0 + VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0 + VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1 + VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2 + VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3 + VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4 + + // h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry h1->h4 + VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1 + VN MOD26, H_1, H_1 + VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2 + VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2 + VN MOD26, H_2, H_2 + VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3 + VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3 + VN MOD26, H_3, H_3 + VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4 + + // h is now < 2*(2**130-5) + // pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo) + PACK(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 + MOD(H_0, H_1, T_0, T_1, T_2) + + // h += s + MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5 + VL (R5), T_1 + VL 16(R4), T_0 + VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big) + VAQ T_0, H_0, H_0 + VPERM H_0, H_0, T_1, H_0 // reverse bytes (to little) + VST H_0, (R1) + + RET + +b2: + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // 2 blocks remaining + SUB $17, R3 + VL (R2), T_0 + VLL R3, 16(R2), T_1 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_1 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $12, $1, F_4 + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + + // setup [r²,r] + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_3, R_3 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_4, R_4 + VPDI $0, R5_1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VPDI $0, R5_2, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + VPDI $0, R5_3, R5SAVE_3, R5_3 + VPDI $0, R5_4, R5SAVE_4, R5_4 + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +skip: + VZERO H_0 + VZERO H_1 + VZERO H_2 + VZERO H_3 + VZERO H_4 + + CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish + +b1: + // 1 block remaining + SUB $1, R3 + VLL R3, (R2), T_0 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_0 + VZERO T_1 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + VLEIG $1, $1, R_0 + VZERO R_1 + VZERO R_2 + VZERO R_3 + VZERO R_4 + VZERO R5_1 + VZERO R5_2 + VZERO R5_3 + VZERO R5_4 + + // setup [r, 1] + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_3, R_3 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_4, R_4 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_2, R5_2, R5_2 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_3, R5_3, R5_3 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_4, R5_4, R5_4 + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1 + MOVD $x-24(SP), R1 + XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage + MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1 + WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1) + XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0 + MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1 + AND $0x40, R1 + BEQ novector + +vectorinstalled: + // check if the vector instruction has been enabled + VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16 + VLGVB $0, V16, R1 + CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector + MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx + RET + +novector: + MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 00000000..e548020b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,931 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx) and the VMSL instruction. + +// constants +#define EX0 V1 +#define EX1 V2 +#define EX2 V3 + +// temporaries +#define T_0 V4 +#define T_1 V5 +#define T_2 V6 +#define T_3 V7 +#define T_4 V8 +#define T_5 V9 +#define T_6 V10 +#define T_7 V11 +#define T_8 V12 +#define T_9 V13 +#define T_10 V14 + +// r**2 & r**4 +#define R_0 V15 +#define R_1 V16 +#define R_2 V17 +#define R5_1 V18 +#define R5_2 V19 +// key (r) +#define RSAVE_0 R7 +#define RSAVE_1 R8 +#define RSAVE_2 R9 +#define R5SAVE_1 R10 +#define R5SAVE_2 R11 + +// message block +#define M0 V20 +#define M1 V21 +#define M2 V22 +#define M3 V23 +#define M4 V24 +#define M5 V25 + +// accumulator +#define H0_0 V26 +#define H1_0 V27 +#define H2_0 V28 +#define H0_1 V29 +#define H1_1 V30 +#define H2_1 V31 + +GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f +DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f + +GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $48 +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b + +GLOBL ·c<>(SB), RODATA, $48 +// EX0 +DATA ·c<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100 +DATA ·c<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·c<>+16(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605 +DATA ·c<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00001a1918171615 +// EX2 +DATA ·c<>+32(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b +DATA ·c<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000001f1e1d1c1b + +GLOBL ·reduce<>(SB), RODATA, $32 +// 44 bit +DATA ·reduce<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·reduce<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfffffffffff +// 42 bit +DATA ·reduce<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·reduce<>+24(SB)/8, $0x3ffffffffff + +// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction] +// uses T_0...T_9 temporary registers +// input: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9 +// output: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2 +#define MULTIPLY(m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9) \ + \ // Eliminate the dependency for the last 2 VMSLs + VMSLG m02_0, r_2, m4_2, m4_2 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_2, m5_2, m5_2 \ // 8 VMSLs pipelined + VMSLG m02_0, r_0, m4_0, m4_0 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r5_2, V0, T_0 \ + VMSLG m02_0, r_1, m4_1, m4_1 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r_0, V0, T_1 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r_1, V0, T_2 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r5_1, V0, T_3 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r5_2, V0, T_4 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_0, m5_0, m5_0 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r5_2, V0, T_5 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_1, m5_1, m5_1 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r_0, V0, T_6 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r_1, V0, T_7 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r5_1, V0, T_8 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r5_2, V0, T_9 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r_0, m4_2, m4_2 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r_0, m5_2, m5_2 \ + VAQ m4_0, T_0, m02_0 \ + VAQ m4_1, T_1, m02_1 \ + VAQ m5_0, T_5, m13_0 \ + VAQ m5_1, T_6, m13_1 \ + VAQ m02_0, T_3, m02_0 \ + VAQ m02_1, T_4, m02_1 \ + VAQ m13_0, T_8, m13_0 \ + VAQ m13_1, T_9, m13_1 \ + VAQ m4_2, T_2, m02_2 \ + VAQ m5_2, T_7, m13_2 \ + +// SQUARE uses three limbs of r and r_2*5 to output square of r +// uses T_1, T_5 and T_7 temporary registers +// input: r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2 +// output: p0, p1, p2 +#define SQUARE(r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2, p0, p1, p2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \ + VMSLG r_0, r_0, p0, p0 \ + VMSLG r_1, r5_2, V0, TEMP0 \ + VMSLG r_2, r5_2, p1, p1 \ + VMSLG r_0, r_1, V0, TEMP1 \ + VMSLG r_1, r_1, p2, p2 \ + VMSLG r_0, r_2, V0, TEMP2 \ + VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \ + VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \ + VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \ + VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \ + VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \ + VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \ + +// carry h0->h1->h2->h0 || h3->h4->h5->h3 +// uses T_2, T_4, T_5, T_7, T_8, T_9 +// t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11 +// input: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11 +// output: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11) \ + VLM (R12), t6, t7 \ // 44 and 42 bit clear mask + VLEIB $7, $0x28, t10 \ // 5 byte shift mask + VREPIB $4, t8 \ // 4 bit shift mask + VREPIB $2, t11 \ // 2 bit shift mask + VSRLB t10, h0, t0 \ // h0 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h1, t1 \ // h1 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h2, t2 \ // h2 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h3, t3 \ // h3 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h4, t4 \ // h4 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h5, t5 \ // h5 byte shift + VSRL t8, t0, t0 \ // h0 bit shift + VSRL t8, t1, t1 \ // h2 bit shift + VSRL t11, t2, t2 \ // h2 bit shift + VSRL t8, t3, t3 \ // h3 bit shift + VSRL t8, t4, t4 \ // h4 bit shift + VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // h2 carry x5 + VSRL t11, t5, t5 \ // h5 bit shift + VN t6, h0, h0 \ // h0 clear carry + VAQ t2, t9, t2 \ // h2 carry x5 + VESLG $2, t5, t9 \ // h5 carry x5 + VN t6, h1, h1 \ // h1 clear carry + VN t7, h2, h2 \ // h2 clear carry + VAQ t5, t9, t5 \ // h5 carry x5 + VN t6, h3, h3 \ // h3 clear carry + VN t6, h4, h4 \ // h4 clear carry + VN t7, h5, h5 \ // h5 clear carry + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ // h0->h1 + VAQ t3, h4, h4 \ // h3->h4 + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ // h1->h2 + VAQ t4, h5, h5 \ // h4->h5 + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ // h2->h0 + VAQ t5, h3, h3 \ // h5->h3 + VREPG $1, t6, t6 \ // 44 and 42 bit masks across both halves + VREPG $1, t7, t7 \ + VSLDB $8, h0, h0, h0 \ // set up [h0/1/2, h3/4/5] + VSLDB $8, h1, h1, h1 \ + VSLDB $8, h2, h2, h2 \ + VO h0, h3, h3 \ + VO h1, h4, h4 \ + VO h2, h5, h5 \ + VESRLG $44, h3, t0 \ // 44 bit shift right + VESRLG $44, h4, t1 \ + VESRLG $42, h5, t2 \ + VN t6, h3, h3 \ // clear carry bits + VN t6, h4, h4 \ + VN t7, h5, h5 \ + VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // multiply carry by 5 + VAQ t9, t2, t2 \ + VAQ t0, h4, h4 \ + VAQ t1, h5, h5 \ + VAQ t2, h3, h3 \ + +// carry h0->h1->h2->h0 +// input: h0, h1, h2 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8 +// output: h0, h1, h2 +#define REDUCE2(h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8) \ + VLEIB $7, $0x28, t3 \ // 5 byte shift mask + VREPIB $4, t4 \ // 4 bit shift mask + VREPIB $2, t7 \ // 2 bit shift mask + VGBM $0x003F, t5 \ // mask to clear carry bits + VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \ + VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \ + VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \ + VESRLG $4, t5, t5 \ // 44 bit clear mask + VSRL t4, t0, t0 \ + VSRL t4, t1, t1 \ + VSRL t7, t2, t2 \ + VESRLG $2, t5, t6 \ // 42 bit clear mask + VESLG $2, t2, t8 \ + VAQ t8, t2, t2 \ + VN t5, h0, h0 \ + VN t5, h1, h1 \ + VN t6, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ + VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \ + VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \ + VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \ + VSRL t4, t0, t0 \ + VSRL t4, t1, t1 \ + VSRL t7, t2, t2 \ + VN t5, h0, h0 \ + VN t5, h1, h1 \ + VESLG $2, t2, t8 \ + VN t6, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ + VAQ t8, t2, t2 \ + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ + +// expands two message blocks into the lower halfs of the d registers +// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs +// input: in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3 +// output: d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5 +#define EXPACC(in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3) \ + VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \ + VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \ + VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \ + VESLG $4, d4, TEMP3 \ + VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \ + VPERM in1, d0, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in2, d3, EX0, d3 \ + VPERM in1, d2, EX2, d2 \ + VPERM in2, d5, EX2, d5 \ + VPERM in1, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \ + VPERM in2, TEMP3, EX1, d4 \ + VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \ + VN TEMP0, d3, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \ + VESRLG $4, d4, d4 \ + VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \ + VN TEMP1, d5, d5 \ + VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d4, d4 \ + +// expands one message block into the lower halfs of the d registers +// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs +// input: in, d0, d1, d2 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2 +// output: d0, d1, d2 +#define EXPACC2(in, d0, d1, d2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \ + VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \ + VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \ + VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \ + VPERM in, d0, EX0, d0 \ + VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \ + VPERM in, d2, EX2, d2 \ + VPERM in, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \ + VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \ + VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \ + +// pack h2:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry) +// input: h0, h1, h2 +// output: h0, h1, h2 +#define PACK(h0, h1, h2) \ + VMRLG h1, h2, h2 \ // copy h1 to upper half h2 + VESLG $44, h1, h1 \ // shift limb 1 44 bits, leaving 20 + VO h0, h1, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1 + VESRLG $20, h2, h1 \ // put top 24 bits of limb 1 into h1 + VLEIG $1, $0, h1 \ // clear h2 stuff from lower half of h1 + VO h0, h1, h0 \ // h0 now has 88 bits (limb 0 and 1) + VLEIG $0, $0, h2 \ // clear upper half of h2 + VESRLG $40, h2, h1 \ // h1 now has upper two bits of result + VLEIB $7, $88, h1 \ // for byte shift (11 bytes) + VSLB h1, h2, h2 \ // shift h2 11 bytes to the left + VO h0, h2, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1 + VLEIG $0, $0, h1 \ // clear upper half of h1 + +// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 +// input: h0, h1 +// temp: t0, t1, t2 +// output: h0 +#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \ + VZERO t0 \ + VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \ + VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \ + VAQ h0, t0, t0 \ + VONE t2 \ + VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \ + VONE t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VN h0, t1, t2 \ + VNC t0, t1, t1 \ + VO t1, t2, h0 \ + +// func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305vmsl(SB), $0-32 + // This code processes 6 + up to 4 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration + // using the algorithm described in: + // NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe + // https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf + // And as moddified for VMSL as described in + // Accelerating Poly1305 Cryptographic Message Authentication on the z14 + // O'Farrell et al, CASCON 2017, p48-55 + // https://ibm.ent.box.com/s/jf9gedj0e9d2vjctfyh186shaztavnht + + LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key + VZERO V0 // c + + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 // c + + // setup r + VL (R4), T_0 + MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6 + VL (R6), T_1 + VN T_0, T_1, T_0 + VZERO T_2 // limbs for r + VZERO T_3 + VZERO T_4 + EXPACC2(T_0, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_1, T_5, T_7) + + // T_2, T_3, T_4: [0, r] + + // setup r*20 + VLEIG $0, $0, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $20, T_0 // T_0: [0, 20] + VZERO T_5 + VZERO T_6 + VMSLG T_0, T_3, T_5, T_5 + VMSLG T_0, T_4, T_6, T_6 + + // store r for final block in GR + VLGVG $1, T_2, RSAVE_0 // c + VLGVG $1, T_3, RSAVE_1 // c + VLGVG $1, T_4, RSAVE_2 // c + VLGVG $1, T_5, R5SAVE_1 // c + VLGVG $1, T_6, R5SAVE_2 // c + + // initialize h + VZERO H0_0 + VZERO H1_0 + VZERO H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + // initialize pointer for reduce constants + MOVD $·reduce<>(SB), R12 + + // calculate r**2 and 20*(r**2) + VZERO R_0 + VZERO R_1 + VZERO R_2 + SQUARE(T_2, T_3, T_4, T_6, R_0, R_1, R_2, T_1, T_5, T_7) + REDUCE2(R_0, R_1, R_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, R5_1, R5_2, M5, T_1) + VZERO R5_1 + VZERO R5_2 + VMSLG T_0, R_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VMSLG T_0, R_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + // skip r**4 calculation if 3 blocks or less + CMPBLE R3, $48, b4 + + // calculate r**4 and 20*(r**4) + VZERO T_8 + VZERO T_9 + VZERO T_10 + SQUARE(R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_2, T_8, T_9, T_10, T_1, T_5, T_7) + REDUCE2(T_8, T_9, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_2, T_3, M5, T_1) + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + VMSLG T_0, T_9, T_2, T_2 + VMSLG T_0, T_10, T_3, T_3 + + // put r**2 to the right and r**4 to the left of R_0, R_1, R_2 + VSLDB $8, T_8, T_8, T_8 + VSLDB $8, T_9, T_9, T_9 + VSLDB $8, T_10, T_10, T_10 + VSLDB $8, T_2, T_2, T_2 + VSLDB $8, T_3, T_3, T_3 + + VO T_8, R_0, R_0 + VO T_9, R_1, R_1 + VO T_10, R_2, R_2 + VO T_2, R5_1, R5_1 + VO T_3, R5_2, R5_2 + + CMPBLE R3, $80, load // less than or equal to 5 blocks in message + + // 6(or 5+1) blocks + SUB $81, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M4 + VLL R3, 80(R2), M5 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBGE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M5 + MOVD $96(R2), R2 + EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + EXPACC(M2, M3, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $2, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $2, $1, H2_1 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO T_4 + VZERO T_10 + EXPACC(M4, M5, M0, M1, M2, M3, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLR T_4, M4 + VLEIB $10, $1, M2 + CMPBLT R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_10 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, square + +load: + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·c<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $64, add // b4 // last 4 or less blocks left + + // next 4 full blocks + VLM (R2), M2, M5 + SUB $64, R3 + MOVD $64(R2), R2 + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, T_0, T_1, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + + // expacc in-lined to create [m2, m3] limbs + VGBM $0x3f3f, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask + VGBM $0x1f1f, T_1 // 40 bit clear mask + VPERM M2, M3, EX0, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_0, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask ready + VPERM M2, M3, EX1, T_4 + VPERM M2, M3, EX2, T_5 + VN T_0, T_3, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4 + VN T_1, T_5, T_5 + VN T_0, T_4, T_4 + VMRHG H0_1, T_3, H0_0 + VMRHG H1_1, T_4, H1_0 + VMRHG H2_1, T_5, H2_0 + VMRLG H0_1, T_3, H0_1 + VMRLG H1_1, T_4, H1_1 + VMRLG H2_1, T_5, H2_1 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + VPERM M4, M5, EX0, T_3 + VPERM M4, M5, EX1, T_4 + VPERM M4, M5, EX2, T_5 + VN T_0, T_3, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4 + VN T_1, T_5, T_5 + VN T_0, T_4, T_4 + VMRHG V0, T_3, M0 + VMRHG V0, T_4, M1 + VMRHG V0, T_5, M2 + VMRLG V0, T_3, M3 + VMRLG V0, T_4, M4 + VMRLG V0, T_5, M5 + VLEIB $10, $1, M2 + VLEIB $10, $1, M5 + + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + // load EX0, EX1, EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + // sum vectors + VAQ H0_0, H0_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, H1_1, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, H2_1, H2_0 + + // h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again + // M0...M4 are used as temps here + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + +next: // carry h1->h2 + VLEIB $7, $0x28, T_1 + VREPIB $4, T_2 + VGBM $0x003F, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_3 + + // byte shift + VSRLB T_1, H1_0, T_4 + + // bit shift + VSRL T_2, T_4, T_4 + + // clear h1 carry bits + VN T_3, H1_0, H1_0 + + // add carry + VAQ T_4, H2_0, H2_0 + + // h is now < 2*(2**130-5) + // pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo) + PACK(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0) + + // if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 + MOD(H0_0, H1_0, T_0, T_1, T_2) + + // h += s + MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5 + VL (R5), T_1 + VL 16(R4), T_0 + VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big) + VAQ T_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VPERM H0_0, H0_0, T_1, H0_0 // reverse bytes (to little) + VST H0_0, (R1) + RET + +add: + // load EX0, EX1, EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + CMPBLE R3, $64, b4 + +b4: + CMPBLE R3, $48, b3 // 3 blocks or less + + // 4(3+1) blocks remaining + SUB $49, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M2 + VLL R3, 48(R2), M3 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M3 + MOVD $64(R2), R2 + EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_4 + VZERO T_10 + EXPACC(M2, M3, M0, M1, M4, M5, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLR T_4, M2 + VLEIB $10, $1, M4 + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_10 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M4, M5, M2, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, square // this condition must always hold true! + +b3: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 + + // 3 blocks remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, T_10, M5) + + SUB $33, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M1 + VLL R3, 32(R2), M2 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M2 + + // H += m0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + VAG H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAG H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAG H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_10 + + // (H+m0)*r + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M3, M4, M5, V0, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_10, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_9) + + // H += m1 + VZERO V0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M1, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10) + + // [H, m2] * [r**2, r] + EXPACC2(M2, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, M5, T_10) + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, next // this condition must always hold true! + +b2: + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // 2 blocks remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + // move h to the left and 0s at the right + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + + // get message blocks and append 1 to start + SUB $17, R3 + VL (R2), M0 + VLL R3, 16(R2), M1 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M1 + VZERO T_6 + VZERO T_7 + VZERO T_8 + EXPACC2(M0, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3) + EXPACC2(M1, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $2, $1, T_8 + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_8 + + // add [m0, m1] to h + VAG H0_0, T_6, H0_0 + VAG H1_0, T_7, H1_0 + VAG H2_0, T_8, H2_0 + + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_10 + VZERO M0 + + // at this point R_0 .. R5_2 look like [r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_10, M0, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10) + SUB $16, R3, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, next + +b1: + CMPBLE R3, $0, next + + // 1 block remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + + // set up [0, m0] limbs + SUB $1, R3 + VLL R3, (R2), M0 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6)// limbs: [0, m] + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + + // h+m0 + VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + + BR next + +square: + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // (h0*r**2) + (h1*r) + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + BR next + +TEXT ·hasVMSLFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1 + MOVD $x-24(SP), R1 + XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage + MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1 + WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1) + XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0 + MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1 + AND $0x01, R1 + BEQ novmsl + +vectorinstalled: + // check if the vector instruction has been enabled + VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16 + VLGVB $0, V16, R1 + CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novmsl + MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx + RET + +novmsl: + MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go index 42106f3f..00ed9923 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ type openSSHCertSigner struct { signer Signer } +type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct { + *openSSHCertSigner + algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner +} + // NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose // private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert // doesn't match the key used by signer. @@ -230,7 +235,12 @@ func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) { return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key") } - return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil + if algorithmSigner, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner); ok { + return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, algorithmSigner}, nil + } else { + return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil + } } func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { @@ -241,6 +251,10 @@ func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { return s.pub } +func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address" // CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go index 30a49fdf..67b01261 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import ( "hash" "io" "io/ioutil" + "math/bits" "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20" "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" @@ -641,8 +642,8 @@ const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" // the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6 // also requires of stream ciphers. type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { - lengthKey [32]byte - contentKey [32]byte + lengthKey [8]uint32 + contentKey [8]uint32 buf []byte } @@ -655,20 +656,21 @@ func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionA buf: make([]byte, 256), } - copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) - copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) + for i := range c.contentKey { + c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4]) + } + for i := range c.lengthKey { + c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4]) + } return c, nil } -// The Poly1305 key is obtained by encrypting 32 0-bytes. -var chacha20PolyKeyInput [32]byte - func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - var counter [16]byte - binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], uint64(seqNum)) - + nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)} + s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce) var polyKey [32]byte - chacha20.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], chacha20PolyKeyInput[:], &counter, &c.contentKey) + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { @@ -676,7 +678,7 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, } var lenBytes [4]byte - chacha20.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength, &counter, &c.lengthKey) + chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) if length > maxPacket { @@ -702,10 +704,8 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") } - counter[0] = 1 - plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] - chacha20.XORKeyStream(plain, plain, &counter, &c.contentKey) + s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain) padding := plain[0] if padding < 4 { @@ -724,11 +724,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, } func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { - var counter [16]byte - binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(counter[8:], uint64(seqNum)) - + nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)} + s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce) var polyKey [32]byte - chacha20.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], chacha20PolyKeyInput[:], &counter, &c.contentKey) + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. @@ -748,7 +748,7 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io } binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) - chacha20.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4], &counter, &c.lengthKey) + chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) c.buf[4] = byte(padding) copy(c.buf[5:], payload) packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding @@ -756,8 +756,7 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writePacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io return err } - counter[0] = 1 - chacha20.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd], &counter, &c.contentKey) + s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd]) var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go index 6fd19945..7b00bff1 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import ( type Client struct { Conn + handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards + forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side mu sync.Mutex channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel @@ -60,8 +62,6 @@ func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client { conn.Wait() conn.forwards.closeAll() }() - go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) - go conn.forwards.handleChannels(conn.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) return conn } @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) { // keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or // an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial // or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the -// net.Conn underlying the the SSH connection. +// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection. type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error // BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go index 73697ded..96980479 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ const ( KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519" ) +// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported +// as algorithm parameters to AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm methods. See +// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1 and +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10 +const ( + SigAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" + SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = "rsa-sha2-256" + SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = "rsa-sha2-512" +) + // parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm. // Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm. func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { @@ -301,6 +311,19 @@ type Signer interface { Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) } +// A AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying a specific +// algorithm to use for signing. +type AlgorithmSigner interface { + Signer + + // SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specification of a + // non-default signing algorithm. See the SigAlgo* constants in this + // package for signature algorithms supported by this package. Callers may + // pass an empty string for the algorithm in which case the AlgorithmSigner + // will use its default algorithm. + SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) +} + type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string { @@ -349,13 +372,21 @@ func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { } func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { - if sig.Format != r.Type() { + var hash crypto.Hash + switch sig.Format { + case SigAlgoRSA: + hash = crypto.SHA1 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2256: + hash = crypto.SHA256 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2512: + hash = crypto.SHA512 + default: return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type()) } - h := crypto.SHA1.New() + h := hash.New() h.Write(data) digest := h.Sum(nil) - return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), crypto.SHA1, digest, sig.Blob) + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob) } func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { @@ -459,6 +490,14 @@ func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey { } func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "") +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + h := crypto.SHA1.New() h.Write(data) digest := h.Sum(nil) @@ -691,16 +730,42 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { } func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "") +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { var hashFunc crypto.Hash - switch key := s.pubKey.(type) { - case *rsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey: - hashFunc = crypto.SHA1 - case *ecdsaPublicKey: - hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve) - case ed25519PublicKey: - default: - return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + if _, ok := s.pubKey.(*rsaPublicKey); ok { + // RSA keys support a few hash functions determined by the requested signature algorithm + switch algorithm { + case "", SigAlgoRSA: + algorithm = SigAlgoRSA + hashFunc = crypto.SHA1 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2256: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2512: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA512 + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + } else { + // The only supported algorithm for all other key types is the same as the type of the key + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = s.pubKey.Type() + } else if algorithm != s.pubKey.Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + + switch key := s.pubKey.(type) { + case *dsaPublicKey: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA1 + case *ecdsaPublicKey: + hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve) + case ed25519PublicKey: + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } } var digest []byte @@ -745,7 +810,7 @@ func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { } return &Signature{ - Format: s.pubKey.Type(), + Format: algorithm, Blob: signature, }, nil } @@ -803,7 +868,7 @@ func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool { } // ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It -// supports RSA (PKCS#1), DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys. +// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys. func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) if block == nil { @@ -817,6 +882,9 @@ func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { switch block.Type { case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + // RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208 + case "PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes) case "EC PRIVATE KEY": return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes) case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": @@ -900,8 +968,8 @@ func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) { // Implemented based on the documentation at // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { - magic := append([]byte("openssh-key-v1"), 0) - if !bytes.Equal(magic, key[0:len(magic)]) { + const magic = "openssh-key-v1\x00" + if len(key) < len(magic) || string(key[:len(magic)]) != magic { return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format") } remaining := key[len(magic):] diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go index d0f48253..122c03e7 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go @@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ userAuthLoop: perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password) case "keyboard-interactive": if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { - authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configubred") + authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") break } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go index a2dccc64..b171b330 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct { // ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket. func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ socketPath, } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go index acf17175..80d35f5e 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go @@ -90,10 +90,19 @@ type channelForwardMsg struct { rport uint32 } +// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections. +// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch +// goroutines until needed. +func (c *Client) handleForwards() { + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) +} + // ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket // on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling // Accept on the returned net.Listener. func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go index 02dad484..731c89a2 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go @@ -108,9 +108,7 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) { return nil, err } - defer func() { - unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios) - }() + defer unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios) return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd)) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go index a2e1b57d..9e41b9f4 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ import ( // State contains the state of a terminal. type State struct { - state *unix.Termios + termios unix.Termios } // IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal. @@ -75,47 +75,43 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) { // restored. // see http://cr.illumos.org/~webrev/andy_js/1060/ func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) { - oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS) + termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS) if err != nil { return nil, err } - oldTermios := *oldTermiosPtr - - newTermios := oldTermios - newTermios.Iflag &^= syscall.IGNBRK | syscall.BRKINT | syscall.PARMRK | syscall.ISTRIP | syscall.INLCR | syscall.IGNCR | syscall.ICRNL | syscall.IXON - newTermios.Oflag &^= syscall.OPOST - newTermios.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO | syscall.ECHONL | syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG | syscall.IEXTEN - newTermios.Cflag &^= syscall.CSIZE | syscall.PARENB - newTermios.Cflag |= syscall.CS8 - newTermios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1 - newTermios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0 - - if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &newTermios); err != nil { + + oldState := State{termios: *termios} + + termios.Iflag &^= unix.IGNBRK | unix.BRKINT | unix.PARMRK | unix.ISTRIP | unix.INLCR | unix.IGNCR | unix.ICRNL | unix.IXON + termios.Oflag &^= unix.OPOST + termios.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO | unix.ECHONL | unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG | unix.IEXTEN + termios.Cflag &^= unix.CSIZE | unix.PARENB + termios.Cflag |= unix.CS8 + termios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1 + termios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0 + + if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, termios); err != nil { return nil, err } - return &State{ - state: oldTermiosPtr, - }, nil + return &oldState, nil } // Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a // previous state. func Restore(fd int, oldState *State) error { - return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, oldState.state) + return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &oldState.termios) } // GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to // restore the terminal after a signal. func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) { - oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS) + termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS) if err != nil { return nil, err } - return &State{ - state: oldTermiosPtr, - }, nil + return &State{termios: *termios}, nil } // GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go index 4933ac36..8618955d 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go @@ -89,9 +89,7 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) { return nil, err } - defer func() { - windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old) - }() + defer windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old) var h windows.Handle p, _ := windows.GetCurrentProcess() |